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INTRODUCI' ION 
1. Problem 
The p!'oblem to be considered is whether Plato r s philosophy 
of art (fine arts) is logically related to his ethico-political and 
metaphysical theories. Is, that is to say, Plato's theOI"IJ of art a 
part of a whole, dependent on or derived from somet hing other than 
itself, or is it self-dependent, autonomous? Is there, in other words, 
such a thing as the unity of Platers thought? 
Such are some of the questions this paper hopes to anmver. 
Other questions to be ansvrered, one hopes, are: Does Plato's concept 
of the censorship of art follow from his metaphysics? Does Plato t s 
philosophy of Beauty follow from b.is metaphysics? Has Plato negated 
art, as charged by Croce ? Does Beauty, conceived by Plato, m ply 
Creativj_ty? Is art teleological? If sO>, what purpose should it serve? 
If not, what is art? What is the relationship of the Good and the 
Beautif ul? Is Beauty definable? 
It will be seen that most of the questions raised are of 
more than academic interest, now as well as in Plato's t:ime. The 
question is \vhether Plato's ans'\f<Ters are useful to modernity .. 
2 . Jvlethod 
This writer intends to proceed as follows: First, there will 
be a brief summary of the cultural and poli tical situation to which 
Plato reacted, and which helped shape his views. Note ~dll be made of 
the thought of Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Socrates, as 
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well as the Sophists against whose epistemology , among other things, 
Plato tilt ed. A sunnnary will be presented of Platers epistemological 
views, followed by an out line of his theOI"J of Forms. Primary sources 
will be Republi c, Timaeus, Sophist, and Parmenides. 
The second chapter will attempt to outline the Plc:,tonic 
ethico-polit i cal features relevant to this paper. It will attempt to 
decide whether Plato's ethico-polit i cs is closel:~r related to his meta-
physics. The chapter will begin with the Platonic conception of 
justice, and discuss the just person and the just state. It will be 
seen >ihether or not Plato's notions of the hierarchic al soul and state 
is derived from the hierarchical world of Forms. 1-1oving on, the c hapter 
vdll discuss Plato's theOI"J of education, with its emphasis on the 
( 
harmony of body and soul, in oroer to have men good in war and in peace, 
for the good of the state and of themselves. The measures deemed neces-
sary to attain these ends will next be discussed. Among such measures 
vdll be censorship and control of art. Primary sources will be 
Republic and Laws~ 
The above t1.vo chapters vdll be featured by a sunnnal"J at the 
conclusion of each chapter. The third chapter, however, cannot by the 
nature of the case be marked by a sumrna!"J, for the third chapter deals 
-vdth Plato's philosophy of art.. And the prima.I"J sources will be Ion, 
Apology, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium, Protagoras, Gorgias, Sophist, 
Republic, Tlinaeus, Philebus, and Lavre. 
In this chapter t he writer vrill present Plato's notions as 
iii 
presented in each dialogue. There ,.fill be no attempt to force Plato's 
views into a preconceived system. If, that is to say, it turns out 
t hat Plato's thought is a Wlity, then the result 1dll not be due to 
selecting what the 11riter wishes to select, but 1dll be due to the 
author of the Dialogues. 
The dialogues will be treated chronologic;olly (for the most 
part) : Ion \.rill be considered prior to Apology, although Apology is 
temporally prior to ~· The reason for this is that Ion has something 
to say , although diffusely, on many aspects of art, vThile Apology is 
limited in scope. Follovring these two dialogues, the dialoe;ues dealing 
wi th the notion of Beauty v-Till be discussed, 't'lith the present 1vriter 
at t emptjng to isolate the problem of the Good and the Beautiful. The 
dialogues will be Phaedo, Symposhun, and Phaedrus, with Phaedrus treated 
l ast , sine e Phaedrus also has samet hing to say on i deal art and artist. 
Foll owing this wiJ_1 be those dialo8ues which are concerned vfith a 
theory of art, qua art. Since Sophist is a more thorough analysis of 
the theory of art as representation than Republic, it 1·1ill be treated 
first. Another reason for the priority of the Sophist is that Republ:i.~ 
has a great deal to say on the function of art. Follm·rine thi s \·Till be 
Timaeus and Phileb1J.s deali ng 1.vith music, with measure and symmetr.r. 
Finally the Laws, which deals with every aspect of art, including a 
theory of the origin of song and dance. 
(Since present ignorance of Greek necessitates use of trans-
lations of Plat o., the Jmvett translation will be used, except in the 
cases of Republic and Sophist , vlhen Cornford' s work will serve.) 
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The fourlJh chapter will be concerned -vr.i..th a critical analysis 
of the cardinal doctrines of Plato >.vhich ~rill have been discussed. 
Following this will be an evaluation, follOi-red by summary and con-
elusions. 
3. Relevant Literature 
1'forks on Plato abound, and many of the works are related to 
some aspect of the present endeavor. Only a very few, ho~<rever, can be 
selected, and all the secondary sources used will be found in the 
section entitled Biblioe;raphy. The reason for the present vli'iter's 
choice is that the works selected are -..mr ks I'Tritten, for the most part, 
by scholarly philosorJhers. 1'1oreover,. the 1r1orks chosen are written 
from differing po:L1ts of vievr. To mention the major seconda~J sources: 
Plato And the Other Comnanions of Socrates._, by George Grote . 
Guide to Philosophy, by c .. E. H. Joad. 
Pl ato 1 s Th~~- of Knov.rledg~ by F. He. Cornford. 
Plato's TheorY of Art , by R. c. Lodee • 
. .~(.. 
Mimesis, by \'l. J. Verdemius. 
Plato 1 s Theory of ~La.?._, by John Wild. 
Pl ato and _~_Olde_r Academy, by Eduard Zeller •. 
The reader• s familiarity 1·dth the thought of the above -vn-iters is taken 
for granted, and no mention need be made of their philosophic positions. 
The question, however, is hmv the major sources bear on the 
present problem. And the reply is as follovrs: 
v 
Grote's classic is of great help in dealing both vdth Plato' s 
theory of Fonns and vdth his ethico-political theories. Joad' s ..,.;rork is 
of some use in dealing with Plato 's philosophy of aesthetics and with 
Plato's ;netaphysics as presented in the Timaeus. Cornford' s work on 
Pl ato's epistemology and on Plato 's theory of likenes ses and sembl~~ces 
is of great help in dealing with Plato's epistemology and 1dth Plato 's 
theo!"'J of art as representation. lodge' 3 work is of some help in 
dealing vrlth the connection bet>feen an art-work and the concept of 
Beauty. Popper's vtork is of some use in dealing with Plato' 3 ethico-
polit ical theories. Verdemius' s Himes is is useful in respect to Plato's 
t heory of art. Wild's v.rork is of use in respect to clarifying some 
points in Phaedrus. Zeller• s ..,.rork is of some use in connection with 
the problem of the Good and the Beautiful. 
None of the above deal directly >dth our problem, but the 
bits (and sc:rnetiJ-ne s chunks) of info:rma.tion to be found in a:rzy- of the 
above works are alvrays useful and sometimes exciting. 
CHAPI'ER I 
PLATO'S THEORY OF FORMS (or IDEAS) 
I 
L 
Before endeavoring to outline Plato's metaphysical theories, 
it, may be vrell to recall some familiar historical data. 
Shortly after the battle of Salamis (480 B. c.), the Persians 
were repulsed. The victory, hm·rever, did not bring peace among the 
cities; on the contrary, it brought friction and conflict, a struggle 
not only for the supremac;>r of Greece, but also for the supremacy of an 
ideal of culture, Sparta fighting for the traditional ideal and the 
privileges of the few, and Athens for the rights of the many. Sparta 
conceived justice to be the interest of the elite, Athens conceived jus-
tice as equality before the law. The struggle may therefore be considered 
as one beti'leen the totalitarian and democratic concepts, alvm.ys granting 
the fact that Athens, with its slaves, was merely a rudimentary democracy 
in the modern sense of the term "democracyu. It is l'Torth poi.11.ting out, 
ho-,rever, that Aristotle remarks1 that some Athenian democrats were against 
slaver.r, on the ground that slavery was against the law of nature: that 
is, that man's law of nature was equality. 
In any event, the passage of time savr the cold >-Tar threatening 
to become othe!""Vdse, perhaps as a result of the Spartan jealousy of the 
trade and prosperity that mariJ::,:iJne Athens enjoyed after the Persian war. 
1. Arist otle, POt., l253b, 20-24. 
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Perhaps, also, the Athenian imperialistic tendencies played same part. 
In 459 B.C., the first Peloponnesian war began. It ended in 
446 B.C., both sides in a state of complete exhaustion, and thus 
presumably ready for a life of reconstruction and peaceful coexistence~ 
This was not to be, for, in 431 B.c., the second Peolopnnesian war began, 
with Athens, having lost her allies, fighting alone against Sparta. 
Victimized by the plague, Athens was forced to sue for peace. Inflation, 
a bankrupt government, a deteriorted arnw, and unprincipled opportunists 
in charge of the government marked the situation.1 
During this period of political strife and instability, Plato, 
son of aristocratic and politically conservative parents, was born 
(circa 427 B.C.). ~fuen the third Peloponnesian war ended (404 B.C.), 
Plato was about twenty-three. That he took active part in the war is 
not known, but is very likely, since all able-bodied youths were 
obliged to serve in the ar:nzy- or navy, especially if they were citizens 
or sons of citizens: refusal to fight meant death. In any event, Plato 
saw trailing in the wake of the war epidemics, f e.mine, civil war, and 
the rule of terror led by his kinsmen, Critias and Charmides. Revolution 
and the re-establishment of democracy gave Plato little relief, for his 
beloved teacher, Socrates, was executed for impiety, unjustly. The 
charge was very likely a pretext for punishing Socrates for being res-
ponsible (so it l'Tas thought) for the terroristic rule of his former 
students, Critias and Cham1ides.2 
. .For Plato, Chaos was ldng, and Uncertainty the heir apparent. 
1. SWain, HC, 123-127. 
2. Popper, OSAE, 21-22, 1S7-190. 
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So Plato sought hannony and certainty: he sought a home. 
In art, mathematics, and philosophy he found a home. 
As an artist, Plato was concerned with fonn, with order:ing 
subject-matter so that the work would yield beauty and perfection. 
}1astering the subject-matter was like mastering Chaos, the indeterminate, 
the unpredictable. To master this was to conquer the world of flux, 
the world of imperfection. 
As a mathematician or rather as a student of mathematics, Plato 
was influenced and impressed not only by the Pythagoreans, but also by 
the harmo:n_y, certainty, and knowledge that mathematics allegedly yields. 
Hathematical. entities were universal, non-sensible, imnutable, and., 
nevertheless, real: more real, indeed, than the sensible world, the 
world of :impennaneme and nux, the world of relativity. 
As a student of philosophy, and especially as a student of 
Socrates, Plato was influenced and ~npressed by the search for ethicc~ 
essences, for the universal definition of terms, such as "wisdom". This 
search by means of cross-examination both eliminated false persuasion from 
knowledge, and implied that no opinion \'las an instance of knov.rledge, 
i.e., absolute, changeless knowledge, grounded in reason ( as e.g., 
logical truths). 
This distinction between opinion and knmvledge led to the 
distinction between two worlds: sensible and intelligible, changing 
and changeless, Many and One, Becoming and Being. 
The concept of the sensible world was bound up with the 
Heracli-t,ean concept of flux: for Heraclitus, change was reality; the 
concept of an eternal changeless intelligible world was implicit in the 
4 
doctrines of the early Pyt.hagoreans, but was made explicit by the poet-
philo s ophe r-la•,'i.!Ilaker, Parmenide s. 
For Plato the question became: Is there knovTledge of the 
sensible world? 1-Jhal:., indeed, is the sensible \vorld? 
II 
Plato's sensible world is one of beliefs (opinions) and :im-
aginings.l It excludes reason, but includes the senses, desires, and 
emotions. It contains images and images of images; 2 but the images 
which common sense would call real and substantial are merely images 
of Forms: their connnon characteristic is impermanence. And thus, there 
are often contradictory judgments of everchanging objects. Except in-
sofar as these judgments encourage refiection,3 the consequences are 
bad, for the many take the resemblance of reality to be reality, and 
thus take the objects of belief to be the objects of knowledge. These, 
moreover, are not the same thing, for 11there could be no sense in 
identifying the infallible with the fallible. n4 
Sensation is infallible, but it is not knowledge because it 
(sensation) is merely the way in l'lhich things appear to a person. 5 
Sensation, furthermore, shol'TS nothing to be the same, which is perceived 
by different men at the same time, or by the same man at different times. 6 
Nor is sensation opinion, for, among other reasons, opinion 
is fallible and sensation is infallible. If opinion were infallible, 
then there would be no such thing as false opinion; and if there were 
1. Rep., 5lle. 
2. Rep., 509e/f. 
3. Rep., 523a/d. 
4. Rep., 477f. 
5. Theat., 15ld/e. 




no false opinion, then diametrically opposed opini ons concerning the 
same object would both be correct, but this is logically impossible. 
What Plato seems to be saying here is that sensat ion is not judgment 
of sensibl e objects; further, he grants that man (each man) is the 
measure of all things insofar as sensation is concerned: that is, llzy' 
sensation is mine and no ot her's; but this, he seems to be saying, is 
a trivi al truism. He would say that a sensation is, but he holds that 
an opinion is and is not, at the same time,1 or rather, the object of 
an opinion both is and is not at the same t :lme. 
Plat o says further, that, if a man has a belief, "there mst 
be something before his mind, 112 and so the believer is not believing 
nothing. But since the object of belief is not 11real 11 , and not "unreal", 
it lies midway between the two extremes. 
Unlike sensations and lmoi<rledge, every opinion is grounded 
in persuasion. That is to say, opinions are blind, not grounded in 
right reasoning. Therefore opinions can be changed by persuasj_on (or 
by reflection); and opinions cannot give an account of itself.3 Since 
this is so, opinions have the possibility of truth or falsehood: know-
ledge, ho'l-rever, can only be true, for false knowledge is a contradiction 
. t 4 1.n erms. 
In conclusion, then, since opinion is of the sensible world, 
and since opinion is not lmovrledge, and since lmowledge is not of the 
sensible world, no one has knov.rledge of the sensible world. And yet, 
as mathematics shov-rs, there is knowledge; this knowledge is of the 
1. Rep., 478e • 
2. Rep., 478b/c. 
3. Tim., 5le. 
4. Zeller, POA, 222. 
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v-rorld of Forms. 
III 
From the forego:ing abstract it is clear that the Heraclitean 
concept of flux first fired the ima,ginat ion of Plato, and impelled him 
to move from one world (sensible) to two: sensible and intelligible. 
Further, it seems clear that the Parmenidean distinction betvreen the 
l-Tay of opinion and the way of knowledge has influenced Plato~ 
Another very :important influence is that of Socrates, whose 
belief in ethical essences 1vas connected 1vith his search for a common 
objective characteristic of particulars ·which would constitute an 
. objective meaning of the term. That is, specific examples of terms, 
such as 11wisdom 11 , did not exhaust the meaning of principles. One had 
to grasp the principle as objective fact and changeless truth, othe:nvise 
one was ignorant. The Socratic innuence was primarily in ethics; 
indeed, the Socratic search was, as Aristotle reinarks, 1 not concerned 
with nature as a whole: Socrates made neither the universals nor the 
definitions independent of the particulars. "\fuat Aristotle has failed 
to note, however, is that Plato's universe is ethical! Therefore, the 
influence of Socrates seems to be more · profound than this writer has 
hitherto believed. Whatever the profundity of the Socratic influence, 
it is important to observe that for both Socrates and Plato, concepts 
alone guarantee knowledge. Further, concepts are :l.mmaterial, and the 
mind grasps the principles. Plato's leap to the eternal world, whether 
logically . justifiable or not, is certa:inly understandable, and psycho-
1. Aristotle, Net. A. 9S7Bl-4, M l07SB 7 • 
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logically justifiable: brute facts alone do not seem to be enough, or, 
to paraphrase a Platonic-Socratic saying: the non-interpretative life 
is not possible to live. 
Another tremendous influence on Plato is Pythagoras, or 
the Pythagoreans, for whom things are copies of numbers, particular, 
changing, accidental, while numbers are forms, universal, changeless, 
essential. Form is the principle of unity, which so orders the "in-
determinate mult iplicity of the sensible 'matt er' that the various 
1 
sensible qualities cohere together to constitute a single ob ject. n 
What has been said above seems to be true of Plato' s Forms. 
The world of Forms is the lvorld of reality, but, as Cornford remarks, 2 
Plato's views fluctuated (at least in his writt en works), and so Forms 
did not constitute all reality: for soul, nature, life, intelligence 
and the Demiu.rge and the heavenly bodies and the earth were real also. 
Forms are eternal, self-existent, changeless. They are the 
archetypes which have their patterns fixed in na:ture. Forms are not to 
be confused with their instances, "even if," as ~Iild puts it,3 11the 
instances are unspecified." 
The contemplation of nature leads us to these archetypes, 
for the world is beautiful because it is patterned after an eternal 
and changeless pattern. 4 "Things can only be understood by us in 
rela-t.ion to their ultimate aim; their true causes are those by means 
of which they become good and fair", 5 and theJr are such because they 
1. Foster, PPPH, 13. 
2. Cornford, PTK, 246. 
3. ~vild, PTM, 213. 
4. Tlli., 28a-29, 30c, also cf. Zell er, POA, 229. 
5. zeller, POA, 229. 
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part i cipate in beauty and goodness, in absolute existence. Zeller 
sunnnarizes: 'There is • • • nothing in the world which does not point 
us to the Idea; noth:ing which has not in the Idea the cause of its 
existence, and of such perfection as belongs to it. nl This implies 
that moral life has moral archetypes, the perceptions of 1-1hich 11must 
guide us, so that our actions may tend towards right ends. 112 
Of these forms, there are, as ZeJler observes,3 an indefi-
nite n~unber. Since every generic and specific conc~pt is held to be 
something substantial, namely a Form, then there must be as many Fonns 
as there are genera and species. Since, moreover, Forms are those 
realities by virtue of 11hich everything is . what . it is, nothing actual 
or imaginable has no Fonn or archetype, for such a thing would be non-
e.tistent, and thus inconceivable. Thus, even such things as hair, mud, 
. l· filth, manure, and so on have Forms. ·· (Plato realizes the difficulties 
in this vie1v, and criticizes it strongly in Parmenides~ but accepts it 
nonetheless, and rightly f:in the context of logiiJ, for "i'fithout 
~universals, communication seems impossible, or limit ed:) 
Forms are related to each other, not s:imply as a multi-
plicity, but also as parts of a whole. '~at holds good of the concepts, 
must also hold good of the entities that are thought in concepts.n5 
They fom a graduated series from the most universal to the most par-
ticular, and in every- conceivable way they cross, combine, exclude, or 
p~icip~te in each other. Science must represent this ~stem, rising 
1. Zeller, POA, 229-230. 
2. Zeller, POA, 229. 
3. Zeller, POA, 272-273. 
4. Par., 130 ff. 
5. Zeller, POA, 276. 
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.from particul.a.r to most universal, down again to particular, defining 
all middle terms that intervene, ascertaining all relationship of 
concepts.l 
The world of Forms is the world to which the soul must aspire, 
for it is the world of knowledge; it is, also, the "source of the being 
of particulars", 2 if particulars may be said to have being, from the 
Platonic perspective. An imperfect horse, for example, is an imperfect 
copy of the perfect, ideal horse; the imperfect is related to the perfect 
as the copy of a painting to an original, or as an offspring to a 
parent) Sunnnari ly, the actual reflects the ideal, or the 11real 11 • 
Sine e the Forms exist independently, and are not ideas in any 
mind, 4- one must explain their manifestation, besides accounting for the 
appearance of sensible things. In Timaeus, Plato offers the concept of 
a Receptacle of Changing, between which and the Forms the Demiurge 
mediates, "bringing the Fonns as it were to birth in the flux". 5 In 
Timaeus, the Demiurge and the Forms are distinct but co-ordinate realities, 
neither dependent on the other, but existing side by side, as it were. 
The activities of the Demiurge in fashioning the i<Torld are dependent on 
and conditioned by the Forms in the sense that the Demiurge r s knowledge 
of the Forms gives him the ideal for his fashioning activity. 6 Just as 
the orderer of cities works from the divine model, so does the demiurge. 
The Demi~ee is thus conceived as a mathematical artist, for his chief 
1. Zell er, POA, 276. 
2. Joad, GrP, 279. 
3. ~., 48e, 50d. 
4. Par., 132ff. 
5. Joad, GrP, 279. 
6. Joad, GTP, 279. 
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concern is order and form, mathematical precision. 
As Joad notes,l the relationship between the Demiurge, the 
For.ms, and the Receptacle of becoming is never precisely stated because 
it is never precisely envisaged. What remains to be noted in regard to 
the Receptacle of Becoming (Space) is tha:t- it is eternal, featureless, 
and percei ved, not by sense, but by a kind of s purious reason . 2 
The structure of the world of For.ms is hierarchical; in the 
Repub~ic it is divided into three parts: Form of Good, which stands alone, 
above all; the moral and intell ectual Forms, which rank next; and the 
other Forms. In the Phaedo- it seems that all the Forrn.s are causes, and 
it seems that the Form of Good, as in Republic, is the principle of order. 
Since order involves, as Wild writes,3 "something that is first, something 
int ermediate, and something that is last 11 , the For.m of Good may be con-
sidered the first cause of all things. It is like its offspring, the 
Sun, the light of all things, and gives truth to the object of knowledge, 
and the power of knowil1_g to him who knows. 4 It is the cause of knowledge 
and truth , and thus not i dentifiable with either. 5 
The Good is only intuitively grasped and thus indefinable. 
At any rate, it is the one essential object of knowledge, without which 
all knowledge is useless. Even the guardians will only know it clearly 
a.f'ter arduous trair1ing and dialect ic . , and only having known it will they 
be fit i'o:r their duties. 6 
1. Joad, GTP, 279. 
2. Tim., 52b. 
3. vlild, PI'M, 27. 
4. Rep., 508e. 
5. Rep., 508e. 
6. Rep., 506a, 533-534. cf Grote, P. IV, 212i'f. 
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The Good is not only first cause, but also final cause. 
11Evel"''J soul pursues f:i'!J as the end of all her actions, dimly divining 
its existence, but perplexed and unable to grasp its nature with • • • 
clearness and assurance. nl Consequently, much of value is missed, and 
all of reality is neither reached nor known, although it is possible 
for the 'SOul to reach and to know reality. This knowledge of the Good 
will come through a teclmique, called Dialectic, the procedure of which 
is more or less as follOi....-s: the study of mathematics frees the prisoner 
from the darlmess of the Cave (sensible world), and the prisoner will 
then see the shadows and reflections of what is real, but not yet the 
real things themselves. Then ~he prisoner must persevere until he 
grasped by pure intelligence the very nature of Goodness itself.2 After 
a ten-years' trainiDg in mathema.tics, this course is to be pursued (age. 
30-35). At the age of fifty, the survivors will become full-fle~ged 
rulers, devoting the greater part of their time to study, but spending 
t he rest of . the time in work:ins for the interests of the state, con-
cerned largely with education and eugenic breeding) 
Finally, the vision of the Fonn of the Good is absolutely 
necessary, for whoever has not had this vision will be unable to act 
with clear wisdom either in his own life or in matt er of state. 4 
Summ.ar-lly, Plato' s ontology is dualistic: he holds to the con-
cept of two vrorlds: sensible and intelligible. The sensibie world is 
the world of flux, of opinion s and imaginings, which contains :images of 
1. Rep., 505a. 
2. Rep., 532ff., 514a-521. 
3. Rep., 539e/f 
4. Rep., 517a. 
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Forms and images of :images. In this world, judgments of everchanging 
objects differ. Except insofar as these judgments encourage reflection, 
the results are bad; for, the many take as reality the resemblance of 
reality, and thus take as the objects of knowledge the objects of belief. 
Opinion, is not knowledge, nor is opinion sensation, for, 
among other things, opinion is fallible, while both sensation and knovr-
ledge are infallible. Sensation, however, is not knowledge, for sensation 
is merely the way in which things appear to a person. Sensation is, 
knm··rledge is, but opinion is and is not. Opinion has the possibility of 
truth or falsehood, while knovrledge cannot be false. Opinion is semi-
real, neither real nor unreal, for it is an opinion about something. But 
since it is not knowledge and is of the sensible world, no one has lmovr-
ledge of the sensible 'l.'i'orld. But there is knovrledge, and it is of the 
world of Fonns. 
Forms are eternal, changeless, self-existent. They are the 
archetypes with their patterns fixed in nature. Ever"~fi,hing has and 
points to the Fonns, . of rrhich there is an indefinite number, which are 
related to each other both as a multiplicity and as parts of a whole. 
The world of Fonns is the world to which the soul nru.st aspire for it 
is the world of knov.rledge, as well as the source of particulars. 
In the Timaeus, Plato offers an explanation of the manifesta-
tion of the Fonns and the appearance of sensible things. Plato introduces 
the Receptacle of Changing, between which and the Forms the Demiurge 
mediates, bringing the Forms to birth, as it vtere, in the flux. The 
Demiurge and the Fonns are distinct but co-ordinate realities, existing 
side by side, but not dependent on the other for existence, although the 
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activities of the Derniurge are dependent on and conditioned by the Forms, 
for lmovlledge of the Fonns gives the Demiurge t he ideal for his fashioning 
activity. 
The structure of the "''Vnrld of Fonns is hierarchical, "'vith t he 
Form of the Good supreme, the other moral and intell ectual Forms next, 
and then all other Forms. The Form of Good is the principle of order, 
first cause, and not identifiable with lmowledge or truth, which are 
effects of the Form of Good. 
The Good is only intuitivel;>r grasped and thus indefinable. 
But it is the one essential object of lmowledge, without which all 
lmovded.ge is useles s . To lmo"'-T this Form require s arduous trainin..g and 
dialectic, and only having It rdll Guardians be fit for their duties. 
The Form of Good is thus not only first cause, but final c ause, and 
whoever has not had the vision of the Form will be unable to act with 
wisdcm either in his o'Wl'l life or in matter of state. 
Since this is so, ethico-political theo~J and conduct is 
connected with met aphysical t heory and vision of the Good~ 




Plato's conception of a best and second-best. possible state 
rests on his conception of justice. Before, hovrever, recording hovr 
justice is defined in the Republ~c. and the Laws, it may be \vorthwhile 
to record Plato's account of how-r a state comes into be:lng. His ovm 
words are worth quoting: 
11 A state comes into existence because no individual is self-
sufficing; we all have many needs. nl Then, "having all these needs, 
"'ve call in another's help to satisfy our various requirements; and when 
we have collected a number of helpers and associates to live together 
in one place, we call that settlement a state. 112 "So if one man gives 
another what he has to give in exchange for what he can get, it is 
because each finds that to do so is for his ovm advantage. 113 
Plato goes on to say that the minimum state will consist of 
four or five men: farmer, weaver, builder, shoemaker. 4 In time, more 
men 1dll be required to satisfy their needs (ecohanic). This state, 
without warriors or guardians, is the ideal state; but lt is impossible, 
Plato i111plies, for people will want luxuries. The luxuries will require 
a larger state, includL11g artists, doctors, barbers, maids, nurses, cooks. 
The country will now be too small, and so the state will have 
1. Rep. , 368f. 
2. Rep., 369a. 
3. Rep., 369a/b. 
4. Rep., 369c/d. 
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to 1-rage war to 11cut off a slice of our neighbor' .s territory", just as 
another state 1.;ill do the same if they rmnt more than is necessary .1 
''This 1.;ill mean a considerable addition to our community-a whole army 
to go out to battle l"lith an invader, in defence of all this property 
and of the citizens. 112 The citizens, hm·rever, may not defend themselves, 
since no man ca11 practice many trades or arts satisfactorily, and the 
conduct of war is an art, and in no form of work is effic :Lency so 
important as in >'far) These guardians, then, will need complete, or 
rather, the most complet e freedom from other occupations and the greatest 
amount of skill and practice; as well as a native aptitude for their 
calling, 4 for each man has a trade or an art 11 for 1-vhich he was naturally 
fitted". 5 Shortly after this, 6 the question of ho1-r the guardians are 
to be brought up is raised, and the Platonic Socrates -replies that the 
answer to this question will help indicate how justi ce and injustice grow 
up in a state. 
Hhat, then, is justice? At the end of the first book, 7 as 
8 -
Grote observes, Socrates says that he does not knovl what justice is, 
1-1hether it is a virtue, or \'.rhether it makes a man happy or unhappy. At 
the beginning of the second book, hovrever, he places justice in the 
highest clas s, 11as a thing which anyone who is to ga1l1 happiness must 
value both for itself and for its resultsJi1 Justice is conceived here 
1. Rep., 373c/d. 
2. Rep., 374a/b. 
3. Rep., 374a/b. 
4. Rep., 374f-375a. 
5. Rep., 374d. 
6. Rep., 376c/d. 
7. Rep., 354. 
8. Grote, P, IV, 19. 
9. Rep., 358a. 
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not only in the abstract but also in terms of consequences. From this 
premiss (of justice belonging to the highe5G class) follows the con-
clusion that the happiest man is the most just.1 Plato, however, must 
be speald.ng nonnatively here, for 11the perfect philosopher is a rare 
growth, seldom seen among men", 2 and the just man is corrupted in 
existing society) 
How, then, are society and individuals at least to approxi-
mate the ideal? 1o1hat principle must state and individual follow, to 
be happy? 
In the Laws, Plato offers the concept of geometrical equality. 
1'l'o the greater more, and to the inferior less and in proportion to the 
nature of each; and, above all, greater honour always to the greater 
virtue, and to the less, less; and to either in proportion to their 
respective measure of virtue and education.n4 
This is compatible with the definition of justice given in 
the Republic. 
What motivates a person to act justly is, in the Laws, the 
desire to avoid pain.5 
Enlightened self-interest is invoked as a ground in the 
Republic. 11 So i f one man gives another what he has to give in exchange 
for what he can get, it is because each finds that to do so is for his 
6 
own advantage." 
In the Republic, 11the observance by everyone, child, or woman, 
1. Rep., 579b. 
2. Reu., 49lb. 
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slave or freeman or artisan, ruler or ruled, of this principle that 
each one should do his o'tm. proper work without interfering with others"l 
is justice. The principle, however, is concerned with socio-economic 
and political matters, for no great harm would be done to the state if 
cobbler and carpenter were to exchange positions and tools and take on 
each other's jobs, or if the same man undertook both, 2 but social ex-
change or interchange would be disastrous, for an artisan is what he is 
by nature, just as a guardian or a warrior is l-J"hat he is by nature. 
Injustice, "the extreme of wrongdoing" consists in the plurality of 
functions, where there are three orders, or the shifting from one order 
to another.3 
Plato assumes the individual to be the state writ small, 
and conversely, and thus holds that the same elements and characters 
that appear in the state must exist in every individual. 4 
The analogy is then dratm. between the just state and the just 
individual. The elements in the soul are reason, the spirited element, 
and appetite, which correspond to guardians, warriors, lower class. The 
individual is ju~t,when the several parts of his soul fulfil their 
functions:5 that is to say, justice in the individual consists in reason, 
aided by spirUed element, controlling and ordering appetite. 
Just as the wisdom of the state lies in its guardians, so 
the wisdom of the individual lies in his reason; just as the courage 
of the state lies in its warriors, so the courage of the individual lies 
1. Rep., 433a. 
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in his spirited element; just as it is better for everyone that t he 
lower class be governed , so it is better for the soul and for the 
indi v i dual that the appetite be governed. Since, then, it is the natural 
right of reason to rule, for the good of the v<hole, then the spirited 
element and appetite, l'lhether in state or individual, ought to be 
gove rned and to obey the rational principle.l 
When such is the case, the individual will not be guilty of 
sacrilege, theft, treason, adultery, disobedience to parental authority, 
oat h-breaki ng, and neglect of religious duties. 2 Justice is held to be 
concerned with the inward man, who sets in on:ler his own inner life , 
and is his ovm master and law, and is at peace with himself. Music and 
gymnastic will harmonize passion and reason, and these combined will 
control desire.4 vlliat it means, then, to be master of oneself , is that 
the 11part which is better by nature has the worse under its control ... 
1'The desires of the inf erior multit-ude vTill be controll ed by the desire s 
and 1visdom of the superior fe>v, 11 and hence the city-state will be 
rrmaster of itself 11 ) 
Moving back to the state, the hierarchical structure, which 
is analogou s to the psychological structure of the soul, and to the 
structure of the world of Forms, entails the concept of ruler, helpers, 
and ruled lower class; 
This is one of the main political theses of the Repubi:ic · and 
1. Rep., 44lf. 
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the LavTS and the statesman: there must be a ruler (or ruling class) 
and a ruled cl~ss. The second thesis is that it is good for the ruled 
class, good, :in fact for the whole, that the lower class be ruled. In 
the La-vrs, Plato carries this vie•-r to its end, namely, that the least 
things should be under the ruler's guidance, whether :in war or :in peace.l 
In the Laws, the older members of the Nocturnal Council are the guardians, 
the younger members their auxiliaries. In the three political tracts, 
the ethical PJ,rposes of the legislator must be enforced; heresy must be 
rooted out, whether by exile or killing. 2 In the Laws, the law·s are 
divine; in the Statesman, the ruler needs no laws, but if the true ruler 
and true form are not available, then fixed law'fs are next best:3 the 
characteristic of a true government is its being scientific: the ruler 
must be a scientific, arlistic, man-god; in the Reoublic, "Socrates" 
is the lawmaker~ 
In the Republic, at acy rate, Plato divides men into two 
classes: guarded and guardians; guardians are divided :into Guardians and 
Auxiliaries; all others are the lower class. 
What are the functions of each? And what dete:rmines the 
selection of each? 
Both sections of the ruling class must have much the same 
temperament and qualities of a well-bred i'latchdog: courage, high spirit, 
and gentleness, so that they will be fearless in war, fierce to the foe 
and gentle to the friend: s:ince :internal dissension in the ruling class 
1. Laws, 924a/b. 
2. LaW'rs, 8S4ff. 900ff, statesman, 297d, Rep., 603-604. 
3. statesman, 297c/d. 
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leads to revolution. 
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The guardians must have a passion for lmm·rledge and undel'-
standing but t hese qualities are sufficient only to become auxiliaries, 
but are not sufficient to become guardians. The guardians need special 
qualities. 
vJhat are such qualities? 
(It may be worthwhile to point out. at this t :ime that Fite 
rema rks2 that Plato does not explain how his class of guardians is in 
the first instance to be selected.) 
As Guardians of the higher section, men with the philosophic 
nature only are qualified, for the philosophi<? nature is one with a 
passion for knowledge, for reality, for truth; the man of philosophic 
nature abhors lies, and is temperate, unaffected, courageous, and free 
from the love of money; more, the man of philosophic natu re must have 
a good memory, and must be just, magnanimous, and gracious. He must 
have had a vision of the Good; and although he might have been reluctant 
to "manage the affairs of men" after having had such a vision, he must 
nevertheless return to the Cave for the good of the Cave-dwellers, since 
having had the vision, h~ understands best the principles of goverrunent3 
and is thus the only one qualifi ed to guard and manage the city-state. 
Since t he Guardian lmo1'TS reality, and hence lmorrs \ihat good 
is, and '\'That ~ GaX:l is, he will draw up laws for the city based on 
the ideal state. Obedience to the laws l"lill result in group harmony. 
1. Rep., 545d. 
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Ho"VT is a guardian to be chosen? 
Not only must he be someone who has seen most of the truth1; 
not only must, he be a lover of wisdan and of lmo1vledge by nature; but 
he must also go through an examination, which includes the ordeal of 
? 
toil and pain, from which the ruler IlD.lst emerge with flying colors.-
Throughout the ordeal the candidate for guardianship must preserve 
"always that perfect rhythm and harmony • • • acquired from • • • 
training in music and poetry11 ) In the Lmre, Plato suggests getting a 
person drunk in order to test him~4 The test 1vill be administered to 
determine whether the candidate has that quality essential to the rull.ng 
class: keeping finn hold of the conviction that one must ahmys do what 
he believes to be best for the state.5 Thus, it seems that "the iderrt.ifi-
cation of the fate of the state (is) wi·l:ih that of the ruling .class". 6 
For, as Plato remarks, "In any fonn of government revolution always starts 
from the outbreak of internal dissension in the ruling class. 117 (This 
however, is questionable.) 
The question now arises: \'Jhat are the duties of the Guardians 
(of the higher section)? 
Plato lists several duties: the guardians must not permit 
extremes of >-realth or poverly to come :into the state, for wealth produces 
luxury and idleness, and poverly produces lo"'r standards of conduct and 
1. Phd., 24Be. 
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worlmlanship; 1 the guardians are 11to take all possible care that the state 
shall neither be too small nor yet one that seems great but has no unity11 ; 2 
the rulers must move down into the lovter classes any inferior child born 
to the guardians, and promote any superior of the lovrer classes ;3 the 
rulers must guard against netf musical modes, for innovations in music 
are a harbinger of political change;4 and political change from the best 
to a worse is bad. And finally, the founding of temples and services to 
propitiate the powers of the other world, and other such religious 
functions must be left to the Delphian Apollo. 5 
lfuat about the governed classes, aside from the Auxiliaries, 
who are, after all guardians of the lower section, but guardians nonethe-
less? What, in short, about artisans · and tradesmen? 
The lower classes must do their jobs, and in doing what they 
are fitted by nature to do, achieve 11virtue 11 • l-'Ioreover, since the lower 
classes are not by nature lovers of -vdsdom, of truth, of knowledge, they 
do not have any knowledge of the Form of the Good, nor of 1ihat good is. 
It is therefore their duty to be taught by the rulers what is good and 
bad, right and wrong. The rulers cannot, however, teach what the Fonn 
of the Good is, because it is not teachable: it is known only by 11vision.u 
This takes one to Plato• s famous theory of education. 
1tfuat is education? And what is its p.tr}:x>se? 
. To answer the latter question first: 11Education is that train-
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ing which is given by suitable habits to the first instincts of virtue 
in children. "l Its good lies in its making "good men, and that good men 
act nobly, and conquer their enemies in batt le, because they are good. 
Education • • • gives victory • • • education is never suicidal. 112 
Education is "education in virtue from youth u:rn-Tards, which makes a man 
eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship, and teaches him how 
rightly to rule and hovT to obey.n3 11The most :important part of education 
is riglTIJ training in the nursery. ,4 The soul of the child ImJ.st be directed 
tm<Tards "right reason, which the law affinns, n5 channed by music into 
harmony with the la\-T. Freedom of artistic expression leads "wrong reason", 
which leads to freedom of disobedience to la\-Ts, and thence to :impiety. 6 
Education aims to :improve mind and body, 7 so that men will be 
able to resist pleasure and endure pain, and thus become good citizens 
and good warr iors. 
The education is in the hands of the guardians to train their 
children8 for war and peace by letting them, among other things, look on 
and become familiar with their duties, just as the son of a cobbler or 
an artisan learns by looking on. One feature of education, then, is to 
have children go to vtar as spectators. 9 
The main program, however, is Music and Grammatic. The a:lm is 
to instill harmony and rhythm in the student, not merely for purposes 
1. Laws, 653a. 
2. Laws, 64lc. 
3. Laws, 643e. 
4. La:vTs, 643e. 
5. La1--rs, 659b. 
6. Lavm .z 70lb. 
7. Rep., 401-404. 
8. Rep., 466e-467a . 
9. Rep., 467c. 
24 
of war, but also for the purpose of becoming a good man: this means 
educating persons in such a wa:y that the student will be able to per-
ceive any defect in nature or in art.1 And this means (intends) a 
recognition of the moral and mental Fonns, as well as an appreciation 
of beautiful things, and the love of Beauty and of Good. In short, 
education is to be aesthetic~ 
Consequently, children are not to listen to any casual tales,a 
since children are impressionable and hence easily corrupted. Thus, 
control and censorship are necessary. This involves discardine most 
of the tales then in use, and expurgating (especially) Homer's works, 
since Homer is the model whom others copy, especially in tales of the 
gods.3 
Poets, that is to sa:y, treated gods with disrespect, and,. 
moreover, depicted the gods as being responsible for evil. But the gods 
are good, and sir..c~e nothing good can be hannful,. the gods are not responsi-
ble for evil; the gods are responsible only for What is good. 4 So at 
least is it held in the Republic. 
The next principle is directed against the poets who held that 
the gods trans•form themselves by magic and mislead people by lies. 5 
Plato demands of the poets, also, that they nmst speak well 
of the other \'10rld, and the representations of the other world, Hades, 
as gloomy nmst be forbidden both as untrue and as injur:i.ous to 11 our 
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future :vmrriors 11 • 1 Men should not be afraid to die or they will not be 
brave "in batt le ... 2 For the same reasons of brave!"'J in battle, the 
poets' "terrifying language" must be banished; and also the waili ng and 
l amenta tions of the famous heroes, for a man of high character must not 
t hink that "death has any terrors for his comrade; and so he will not 
mourn for his friend's sake, as if something terrible had befallen him11 ,3 
When someone close to you dies, Plato implies, a person must be realistic, 
using his reason and not giving way to his emotions, which, after all, 
are pal~ of the world of belief, and hence of semi-reality. Again, the 
Guardians should not "overmuch £:hi/ given to laughter 11 ;4 and 11a high value 
must be set upon truthfulness"5; but 11if anyone , then, is to practice 
deception , either on the country's enemies or on its citizens, it must 
be the Rulers of the commonwealth, acting for its benefits; no one else 
may meddle l'i"ith this privilege "• 6 · Next, the guardians will need self-
control, and 11for the mass of mankind that chiefly means obeying their 
governors, and themselves governing their appetite for the pleasures 
of eating and drinking and sex.u7 
Another thing not to be taught is that gods and princes are 
bribed by sacrifices and gift offerings.8 Later, Plato speakd of leaving 




















of gods, demigods, and heroes; the burial of the dead and services to 
propitiate:_ the pmvers of the other world." 
Again, poems depicting wrongdoers as happy, and just men as 
miserable are to be prohibited, and the poets are to be told to compose 
others in the contrary sense. 1 
Fictions, then, are indispensable, but the criterion of moral 
eff ects is all-important, as Grote notes. 2 
From the premiss that the same poet cannot write tragedy and 
comedy with equal success, Plato holds that guardians should stick only 
to their duties, with no time out for comedy or tragedy impersonations. 
If, hO\·rever, the guardians do act, they are to impersonate only the 
appropriate types of character: brave, religious, self-controlled, 
generous. They are not to impersonate or to take "any notice of such 
occupationsn3 as tradesmen. Thus it seems reasonable to infer, first, 
that, aristocratic prejudice prevails here and, secondly, that the lo\'rer 
class is needed only to produce what the guardians need, in order for 
the latter to study and live in leisure. 
Since the artisan does not possess the qualities which Plato 
considers most admirable, then 11 for our own benefit, we shall employ 
the poets and story-tellers of the more austere and less attractive type, 
who will reproduce only the manner of a person of high character and, in 
the substance of their discourse, conform. to those rules we laid down 
. 4 1 when we began the education of our wa.rrJ.ors 11 • Consequently, P ate's 
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state will be 11the only state :in which we shall f:ind a shoemaker who 
cannot also take command of a ship, a farmer who does not leave his 
farm to serve on juries, a soldier who is not a tradesman into the 
barga.:in".l Every man has his station and his duties, and he is not to 
leave or attempt to leave what he is fit for by nature. 
Plato turns next to Husic. \'lords, he says, rust conform to the 
rules he has already made for the content and form of literatu~e. Of 
modes, he regards the Dorian and Phrygiru1 as desirable, for they best 
express 11the accents of courage in the face of stern necessity and mis-
fortune, and of temperance in prosperity won by peaceful pursuits 11 • 2 
From this it follovJS that the most desirable rhytluns are those 11 ap-
propr:iate to a life of courage and self-control11 .3 Just what rhythms 
t hese are Plato does not know at the moment, but he will consult Damon, 
a friend of Pericles. 
As noted earlier, one of the educational a:ims tvas the :improve-
ment of mind and body. Music and literature are the means for :improvi11g 
t he mind (or soul); for improvmg the body the means are Gymnastic, 
physical training. 
Drunkenness is forbidden, 4 the food must be simple5 (no fish, 
no boiled meat, only roast, and no sweets), and no exces sive care of the 
body, crver and above the exercise it needs to keep it :in health. 6 
. ~hysicians and judges will be established in the state, although 
1. Rep., 397e. 
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no medical. school is envisaged, and such gentlemen, who must be old, are 
to look after those with constitut iona,llj' sound bodies and souls. 
''The physically unsotU1d they will leave to die; and they will 
actually put to death thos e who are :incurably corrupt in mind.n1 This 
will be "the best thing for them f3TictmiJ as well as for the community". 2 
lfi..oreover., if "the breed of our guardians is to be kept pure 11 , then 
infanticide is necessary and desirable. 
So are "considerable doses of imposition and deception11 by the 
guardians of the masses 11for their good 11 ,3 that is, for the good of the 
masses. It •·muld also be desirable to have the "medicinal lies11 accepted 
by the rulers ., if possible.4 
One indispensable 11medic inal lie 11 is t he IIQ-th of t he metals , 5 
designed, maong other things, to ke ep the guardian breed pure and in 
control of the state. 
The myth is as foll ows: the legislator •·Till try to convince, 
first the rulers and the -warriors,, then the community that any nurture 
and education received was only something they seemed to experi~~ce as 
it were in a dream. In reality, they were all the time do1m inside the 
earth, being moulded and fostered >vhile their arms and all their equip-
ment 1vere being fashioned also. Then, when they were complete, they 
were sent up from the earth :into the light of day. So the land must be 
thought of as a I!lOther and nurse to be defended against any attack, and 
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all fellovJ citizens are brothers of the same soil. But the gods mixed 
different metals in the compositions of different persons. The golden-
born are those fit to rule, silver, the auxiliaries, iron the fanners, 
and brass the craftsmen. It will be announced that nothing is to be 
watched so carefully as the Ird_;,..'"ture of metals in the souls of children. 
If a golden boy is born with an:. alloy of iron or brass he is to be 
demoted, thrust out among the craftsmen and farmers, if iron or brass 
boy has gold or silver he is to be promoted to be a guardian or warrior~ 
Then, it is to be proclaimed that an oracle has prophec ied 
ruit~ on the state if it gets into the hands of iron or brass men. 
Since it is doubtful that the lie will be believed in the first 
generation, the legislator will leave its success to popular tradition. 
This myth is open to several questions: First, what happens 
to the state when a child knovrs his father, as the golden boy born of 
iron parents will lmow his pc;trents? Secondzy, hmf is the lower class 
lad to be selected? at what age? ani how is it known that the child will 
develop into what he is expected to develop, since many prodigious 
children do not become exceptional adults. Thirdly, what is meant by 
"mixture of metals" ani by ''alloy"? Plato holds that the mixture of 
metals is the birth and lineage of civil strife eveljiV'There.l How can an 
upper-class boy have an alloy, and a lo;.rer one not? Fourth, since 
education begins in the nursery, what provisions are made for the lower-
class lad who is discovered at the age of, for example, ten, to be 
exceptional? 
To sum up this chapter, justice is evei"J order doing its ovm 
proper wo:rk, that is, doing what one can do best, naturally; justice 
1. ReE., 546a ff. 
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entails ruler and ruled. Injustice is social and political interchange: 
it is against nature. Lli<~e the world of Forms and like the individual 
soul; the political order is hierarchically structured: the Form of the 
Good, the mental and moral Forms, and the other forms; reason, spirit and 
appetite; guardians, vmrriors, and lower class. 
Virtue is obtained by doing well what one is fit to do by nature. 
The guardians' duties are to rule for the good of the state; the auxiliaries• 
duties to obey the guardians in everything; the lo1-rer class duties are to 
be governed and to control their appetites. No one is allovred to criticize 
the decisions of the Ruler, since he represents Reason in the state. In 
the Laws, Plato holdsl that no young man should question his elders or 
the laws; that the Ruler, whether i.11' peace or in war, should be a guide 
even in the leas·!:, things. The justification for this is prestunably that 
the Ruler embodies Reason in the sta:t.e.- Thus, it is good for the subject 
classes to be governed. 
Plato's society, fundamentally, consists of two classes: guardians 
· and guarded, with the guardians dd.vided into guardians and auxiliaries. 
The auxiliaries are the 1'1atchdogs to obey their liEl.sters in everything, for 
the good of the whole (state), since Plato ;i'ejects the doctrine that justire 
is the interest of the stronger. The ruling class must have all the 
qualities deemed necessary for a ruler, such as courage, fierceness to foe, 
and gentleness to friend. Hore, the guardians must be men with philosophic 
. natures, lovers of truth and of wisdom, who, in their wisdom, may have 
to resort .-:to myth and lies, for the good of the state. The rulers must 
1. Laws, 884-885, 659e, 690a. 
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be men who have had training not only in music and grammatic, but also 
in mathematics and dialectic. They must, moreov er, be men who have gone 
through the worst ordeals with flying colors. In a word, the rulers 
must be supermen. 
Such men are qualified to manage the affairs of' other men as 
well as their ov-m, f'or they have seen most of' the truth, and so under-
stand best the principles of' goverrnnent. The most desirable and most 
essential quality is . the finn conviction that one must always do li'hat 
he believes to be best for the state. Among those things believed best 
for the state are: no extreme of luxury and povert.y, no disrupting 
innovations, musical and othertdse, respect for the gods and the laws, 
music for the health of the soul, gymnastic for the health of the body, 
with the emphasis on music and the ~oul. Plato's measures, even when 
questionable, are thoroughly understandable. 
Education is directed towards a harmony of body and soul, 
intended to ma..l{e the guardians and auxiliaries good both in peace and 
in war. The emphasis on education and nurture is especially important 
in respect to the function of art.. Further, Plato's psychological theories 
are also int:llllately connected with his notions on art.. But this will be 
discussed in Chapter Four. 
In the meantime, one may now turn to Plato's theory of art.. 
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CHAPrER III 
PLATO'S PHTIDSOPHY OF ARl' 
I 
The first work to be looked at is the Ion, which is not the 
first dialogue in point of time, but which is the first (chronologically) 
in which Plato has said something about the total artistic process, 
including the composer's creative process. It is true, of course, that 
Plato makes no positive assertions concerning the nature of art, but 
this is perhaps the result of the fact that Plato was unable at the time 
to express what was merely germinal in him, or perhaps Plato was as yet 
uncertain in his opinion on the nature of art. 
In the Ion Plato advocates the view that the poet does not 
compose rationally: he is inspired by some god, and so does not compose 
by the rules of art.l Inspiration means madness and enthusiasm, 11 like 
Bacchic maidens iiho draw milk and honey from the rivers, when they are 
under the influence of Dionysus, but not ••• in their right mind11 • 2 
The poet, then, sings 11by Power divine 11 ) So, the poet is 11 a light and 
winged and holy thing", 4 without invention until inspired and 11the mind 
is no longer in him".5 
Since thought and reason are absent, lmowledge is absent. Art, 
therefore, is not knowledge; hence the people should not look to the 
artist as a source of lmo.,rledge. 
Moreover, Pla:t.o says in effect, if one has an understanding of 
1. Ion, 534a-535e. 
2. Ion. 534b. 
3. ~, 534e. 
4. Ion, 534b. 
5. Ion, 534c. 
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(say) a bul:,cher' s trade, he does not thereby have an tmder standing of 
medical surgery (although butchers and surgeons both use lmives). So 
if one is a poet, he does not thereby understand philosophy, although 
both use words. 11That 'lt<hich we know· 1-dth one art we do not lmovr with 
the other. 111 In fine, the Socratic influence--the demand for t he expert--
is present here also. 
Plato then moves on2 to picture the artistic process as a 
series of rings, which derive their power from an original magnet (the 
Muse), with the poet, actor, and audience (respectively) as the lin..ks. 
Pl ato omits the work of art, but one may assume that the work of art is 
presupposed by Plato to be a link. In any case, none of the links are 
guided by reason, but by the senses and emotions, or, what would seem to 
fo l lovT, by the will of the gods. 
It is difficult to decide 1ihether Plato's picture of the 
artistic process anti cipates the modern vie~-v of empathy, or whether it 
is something like a theory of emanation, moving from Huse to poet to >'fork 
of art to actor to audience. In any case, it is questionable >·Thether 
aesthetic appreciation is possible without the functioning of r eason. 
II 
The point of view in Apology is similar to that in 1.£!!• 
"Not by v-Tisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius 
and inspiration.n3 "There is hardly a person present who would not have 
1. Ion, 537~. 
2. Ion, 533c/d, 535e-536b. 
3. Apol., 22c. 
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· talked bett er about their poetr-.r than they {the poetiJ did themselves. n1 
And yet, 11upon the stren.:,crth of their poetry they believed themselves to 
be the "t-v.i..sest of men in other things in ~"lhich they were not wise. u2 
There is, hmiever, one point of .fresh interest to the problem 
under consideration; and that is the fact that the principal accusation 
against Socrates is by a poet called Meletus, who quarreled with Socrates 
on behalf of the poets) 
That this is significant in respect to Plato's attack in 
Book X of the Republic is highly questionable. 
III 
In some respects the Phaedo is one of the most interesting 
of the Dialogues , especially in the context of aesthetics. 
When visiting Socrates in prison, Cebes remarks that Evenus 
t he poet wonders whether it is true that Socrates is putting Aesop into 
~ 
verse and also compos ing a hymn in honor of Apollo.~ Socrates replies 
in the affirmative. It is the truth, Socrates says, that he has never 
w-ritten a line of poet!"'J previously, but he has had a persistent dream 
in which the recurring .-rords are to make and cultivate music, which 
meant someth:in.g other t han the pursuit of philosophy, the noblest and 













·Conversation continues, and Socrq.tes remarks that poets say 
rightly that sight and hearing are inaccurate witnesses. This remark 
is made in connection with the question whether the body is a help or 
hindrance in the endeavor to acquire knowledge. (Plato concludes that 
the body is a hindrance.) The implications of this are various and 
interesting in respect to poetry, for instance. For one implication is 
that true poetr:,r comes about when and only when the senses are either 
left aside or distrusted and reason or contemplation or (perhaps) 
intuition is the guide. }foreover, true poetry consists in glorif ying 
what reason 11 sees 11 to be worth.y of glorif ication, such as the gods, or 
the Good, or Beauty. There is also implied, perhaps, the vie11 that if the 
poet cared more for reason and did not allow himself to be seduced by 
the senses or emotions, then a.rw poet of great talent would be a true 
poet. Plato's view also implies that a true poet ·should be at all times a 
critic of what is popularly acclaimed, such as the sensed. 
But all this seems vitiated when one reflects that Plato almost 
:bnmediately goes on to say1 that recollection, which is knOi..,.ledee, derives 
from things either like or unlike: that is, when one sees a man, one 
remembers another man; when one sees material "equals 11 , one moves .to the 
idea of absolute equality, which idea was known previously to the time 
when material equals were first seen. In short, the senses, and therefore 
the body are necessary in the endeavor to acquire lmmvledge. 
There follows a discussion of harmony, whic h is not to be con-
strued as the modern theory of harmony in music. Hann.ony for Plato means, 
when referring to the personality, we believe, an integrated personality: 
the "Vrord in this context 11 justice11 may, it seems, be interchanged with 
1. Phaedo, 74a-74c. 
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11 harmony11 • Harmony, says Plato,l is a compound of elements, made last 
of all and perishing first. (Ergo, the soul is not a harmony.) Harmony 
follov1s the elements, without any motion, sound, or other quality opposed 
? 
to the parts.- Being absolute~ a harmony, it has no part in what is not 
harmonical; likevlise, beauty has no parl i n the ug~ (non-beautiful). 
Absolute Beauty is self-existent, the cause of beautiful t hings: 
anything beautiful can only be so, insofar as it partakes of Absolute 
Beauty .J As lodge illustrates4 the approximate purity of the tones suggest 
the latent ideal, and only insofar as the tones seem to embody the ideal 
is the experience of the tones 11charming 11 ~ 
lV 
Eryximachus, in s;vriux>siuni, characterizes music as ·the reconcili-
ation of opposites. 5 What precisely this means is not known for certain, 
but it may be assumed to mean the synthesis of the Dionysian and Appolonian, 
since Eryximachus goes on to say that vThen the principles of music are 
applied in educa:t.ion with their accampan:iJnmts of song and meter, the dis-
cord begins and the good arlist is needed. 6 The function of the good 
artist is to implant rhythm in the soul, so that the listener mey be an 
harmonious and thence virtuous person. The aesthetic qualit i es, t hen, 
conduce to certain moral effects. 
Aristophanes contributes the opinion that love is an acknowledge-
1. Phaedo, 93a-f. 
2. Phaedo, 93b. 
3. Phaedo, lOOd. 
4. lodge, PTA, 239. 
5. ~., 187a ff. 
6. ~·, 187a-189a. 
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ment of imperfection:; that love is a lack and implies a desire for what 
is lacking.1 
Agathon contributes the opinion that love is love of beauty, 
2 
the cause of every good in heaven and earth. The birth of love has 
meant the end of the rule of necessity.3 
It is now Socrates' turn to speak; but before giving him the 
floor, something must be said about some of the questions to be ansvrered 
in the context of aesthetic theo~J. First, what is meant by the word 
4 
nbeauty11 ? Secondly, 11 Is there a criteri on or standard by reference to 
which we can assess and compare the aesthetic merit of different works of 
artn? Is beauty definable?5 
According to Zell er, 6 Beauty is reduced to Good. If Beauty and 
Good do not refer to the Forms, then there is a sense in which both 
Zeller is correct. For a beautiful thing may be held to be considered 
by Plato aesthet ically good, which is not good in every sense of the term. 
For example, Plato would hold that Alcibiades was beautiful, but not that 
he was mor~ good: in this case, "beautiful" is clearly synonymous with 
"aesthetically good 11 • But 1-1hen it canes to the Forms, something 
diff erent obtains. For the Form of Good is here dependent on or a 
little lo'\'rer in the hierarchy than the Form of Beauty: wisdom, for exa"!lple, 
is held to be beautiful, and love is love of the beautiful.? And yet 
1. ~·, 19la-193a. 
2. ~·, 197a-f. 
3. Sym., 197d-e~ 
4. Joad, GrP, 327. 
5. Joad, GRP, 327. 
6. Zeller, POA, 506-507. 
7. ~., 20la ff. 
Plato writes 11 is not the good also the beautiful? 11 , thus rendering a 
correct interpretation very difficult if at all possible. ~Jhat could 
be the case is that Plato would hold Good to be connected idth action 
and Beauty with contemplation; thus every good act is beautiful, but 
every contemplation is good if it is the contemplation of Beauty., or 
manif estations of beauty, such as laws. 
Beauty, like Good, may be apprehended on earth by a mystical 
2 
vision, invol,ring both immediacy and separation from self , but the 
process of apprehending differs, for the study of dialectics does not 
seem necessary for the apprehension of Beauty (at least in the Symposium). 
Now although 11beautyn (e.g. "beautiful things") may be definable, 
the Form of Beauty is not definable. Nevertheless, people must knm·r what 
they mean by Be\luty, othervrise it makes no sense to say one strives to..,rards 
a ~ ~ sais quo:i.. Yet people strive. The quest begins, Plato holds, 
with beautiful things of earth; then the seeker moves to appreciate 
several forms. The seeker then perceives that the beauty of one form is 
that of the other; hence, the seeker becomes a lover of all fair forms. 
Hoving on, the seeker sees and contemplates the beauty of law·s and in-
stit.ut ions and then the beauty of the sciences. Then, when the seeker 
has learned to see the beautiful in due order and procession, he will 
suddenly see a nature of wondrous beauty, absolute, simple, separate, and 
everlasting Beauty; and he who sees this will knovr at last what the essence 
of Beauty . is.. In that communion, beholding Beauty with the eye of the mind, 
1. ~., 20lc/d. 
2. Joad, GTP, 328. 
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the seer idll be enabled to bring forth not images of beauties but 
realities. Thus "rill he bring forth and nourish true virtue, and become 
i.nrrn.ortal if moral man may •1 
Beauty, then, simply is, and it is indefinable, absolute, self-
existent. It is no invention or characteristic of the mind. It is the 
Final Gause. 
1Nhen, therefore, a work of art is considered beautiful, the 
beauty means the necessary connection between the work of art and the 
Form. That is, unless the work of art has manifested in it the essence 
of Beauty, any judgment that the work is beautiful is false. The frame 
of reference of the work of art is to be found only in the Fonn of 
Beauty. A work is beautiful by virtue of the artist's capacity to see 
Beauty, for only then can he disentangle the manifestation of the Form 
from the physical setting in which it appears; thus, he will produce 
't'/orks with that "significant fonn in virtue of which we say that it has 
2 
aesthetic value". Thus, the best work is the formally excellent, god-
inspired work. 
In sum, Beauty, the Final Cause, gives meaning to all the lower 
things of beauty; It is seen only by those of great virtue, and It is 
beyond being, beyond knowledge (in the conceptual sense), yet words can 
give a clue to its nature, and comparisons or contrasts between it and 
ordinarily beautiful things can be made. Beauty is self-sa"D.e, stable, 
enduring. All things else come into being and move right out again. 
Everything on earth, be it ever so beautiful, is finite and mortal, chang-
ing, but Beauty is perma11ent. More, Beauty is i.mporta11t for us for 
1. ~·, 206-212b. 
2. Joad, GTP, 354-356. 
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our desire for beauty, our instinct for procreation, our desire for 
:ilmnortality, for the birth and generation of beauty1--all these and more 
are nothing but our participation in the principle everlasting of Beauty. 
Yet all these things are good, and hence participation in the Good. But 
if Beauty is not identified with Good, it is, in Symposi!!; higher than 
Good, as has just been shown. 
The :iJnplications of this vieiv in respect to Plato • s ethics, 
politics, metaphysics, and epistemology are almost self-evident. The 
quest for Beauty is not in principle vain on earth, it is merely difficult 
to fulfill: hence the artist must seek the Form and tl"IJ to be guided by 
the v:isiol'l of the Fonn; only then will he know reality and invent what 
approximates the real; rather than a shadmv of the real; only then will 
he be virtuous. It is then the artist is a true artist, and hence a 
philosopher-artist , and hence able to be a guide towards a good life, 
as 1-rell as a source of knowledge and truth. 
Hence the artist becomes a virtuous man, when he becomes an 
:ilnitator of the pr:l.me Model. As such he is capable of ordering ste..tes 
and act:il1g with wisdom not only in his own life but in politica~ li:t'e~ 
Hence he is pr:ilnarily a moral being, metaphysically real since he knows 
the Forms and his soul acts as it should act. And because his character 
is good, it is beautiful, for what is good is 1mat functions excellently, 
(has apet.e ) and vthat fl.U1ctions excellently is what fl.U1ctions harmoniously, 
and vmat functions harmoniously is what ftUlctions beautifully. Hence 
the good is the beautiful. 
1. ~· ' 207-200. 
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v 
Phaedru.s has a bit to say on Beauty, and on Eros. In the 
Rhaedrus knowledge is recollection, and the true light is recoll ection 
of the past: 1 when one sees the beauties of earth, one is transported 
with the recollection of the true beauty. 2 11A god-like face or form is 
the expression of divine beauty.•t3 The sight of the beauties of earth 
causes ec.stasy; : one would like to fly away but one cannot. Love, then, 
is div:ine madness, and no one is an authentic artist unless moved by 
Love, which means unless the soul is released from custom and convention. 4 
This divine madness and inspiration is placed on a higher plane than 
reason, for divine madness is one of the chiefest blessings to man; this 
madness takes the form of prophecy, love, and propitiation by utterance, 
and poet!'"IJ. In this sense, Beauty outshines the Good. That is Beauty 
is identified with Love (love of beaut.y), and nothing not inspired by 
Beauty is worth nmch. Hence Beauty is placed on a higher scale in the 
Phaedrus than the Good, at first sight; but when we reflect that Plato 
later goes on to say that eve!"Jone ouglrli to act for the Good, then it 
seems that both Beauty and Good are not identifiable but co-equal. In 
this, hm-rever, the writer may be mistaken-. 
Phaearus is also concerned with the ideal artist and ideal 
art. If an artist is to be regarded as a true artist, he Imlst follow 
certa in . ~les and standards of art. First, he must know the "real nature 
1. Phd., 250a-d. 
2. Phd., 249e. 
3. Wd., 25la. 
4. Thd., 26 5a. 
of everything 11 , 1 or the results will be bad: that is, the resv~ts will be 
a degenerate movement from truth 11 into the opposite of truth which is 
. 2 
eff ected by the help of resemblances. 11 If someone, that is to say,; 
ignorant of the true nature of things, offers appearances as reality, 
then the art is no art, for the artist IlD..lst know the true nature of 
evel"''fl,hing. But trnth must be combined with appeal, for an artist must 
knmv t he psychological makeup of every human being he l'l'ill address his 
art to; the artist must knOi·T l'l'hen to use 11 pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, 
sensational effects. u3 1'lhen a person knows this he is a master of his 
~· }Tore, poetl"j7 or prose is of l:ittle value unless it is didactic. 
Further, 11even the best of writings are but a reminiscence of "'oihat we 
knol'r11 ,4 and connnunication of justice and nobility is the true way of 
"'oJriting. Only a writer who follows these rules is worthy of being called 
a philosopher: 5 
In regard to fonns Plato holds that ev;ery work of art must have 
a begilming, middle, and end, agreeable to one another and to the whole~ 
Whether Plato means tecPnical or formal completion is unclear, perhaps 
he means both. If so, then art must be a complete whole, serving as a 
means to the Good or to Beauty. Art is then not intrinsicalJy valuable, 
but only extrinsically so; and yet this is not wholly so, because Plato 
holds that art must be beautiful as well as serve morality. Hence if art 
is beautiful, it is beautiful by virtue of Pa..rticipating in Beauty, 
which is intrjnsically valuable. If Beauty is valuable in ~' and if 
1. Phci., 272b. 
2. Phd., 275b. 
3. Phd., 271-273. 
4. mw, 27Sa-e. 
5. fh£•, 27Se. 
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Beauty is the 1.-mole (or the essence), then surely beauty in an art-work 
must be intri nsically valuable, since what is true of the whole should 
be true of the part. This, at lea st, is one possible answer to a critic 
who would hold that Plato does not consider art at all intri nsically 
valuable.-
Since art is largely extri nsical l y va luable, leading to love of 
beauty and of good, art is teleological. Hence the artist qua artist may 
be termed a teleological being: he must know where he is going, and >vhat 
is his purpose :in composing the work of art. 
Just as in the Gorgias there was a dist:U1ction behreen artist 
and quack, so in the Phaedrus, there is the :implied distir1ction made 
betv.reen the two. For Plato writes1 that the true artist is the true 
philosopher, guided by reason, moved by love, with an understanding of 
t he nature of that vrhich he writes about. Any other type of artist is 
merely "poet or speechmaker or lawmaker", concerned more -vfith cheap 
applause, flatte ry, and gratif ication of one's self than with truth; 
hence such a person i s neither moral nor rational~ 
In conclusion, as John h~"ild notes, 2 skill is gained only from 
practice, 11 since t he accident al variations of material things are too 
manifold to be encompas sed :in any 'theory' of essential structure." 
It may be said at this po:int that Plato's thought is all of a 
pi ece vlhen it comes to the role of art as a teacher and guide to Good and 
Beauty. In Phaedru.s, hoHever, Beauty and Good are co-equal, >·rh ile in the 
Republic, . Good is prime, and in the SYJit.l!¥itun~ Beauty is prime; yet the 
1. Phd·., 278e • 
2. 'Vfild, Pl'M, 49. 
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Protagoras in one respect is that Plato has a Sop~ist deliver ideas, 
which Plato elsm'lhere insists are those ideas which Sophists do not in 
fact hold, and hence are corrupters of the body politic~ 
VII 
The Gorgi12:~ is concerned with moral responsibili tJr, and hence 
with mora~ responsibil ity in art. 
In art, the artist needs to be infonned vlith a moral purpose 
(as 1vell as technique and understandin_g), for an "artificer of persuasion" 
with no other business and no other endl is immoral, since such a man 
"creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no :Lnstruct ion about 
2 
them." Only true art, then, is a source of virtue. 
Plato d.ist:ineuishe s bet;veen true and false art, or, in other 
terms , betlveen art and "experience", exemplified respectively by medicine 
and cookery,3 or philosophy and rhetoric. Like cookery, rhetoric produces 
only a sort of delight and gratification. Just as cookery is a false 
imitation of the art of' medicine, rhetoric is a false imitation of the 
royal art of politics. l· Rhetoric knmvs how to manage :ma..TL1dnd by flattery, ' 
just as ornaments give the body a spurious beauty, instead of t he true 
beauty given by gymnastic. This is an instance of moral irresponsibility, 
for one pretends that it is as good to seem to be as it is to be. As 
ioJ"ith t he rhetoric ian, so with the poet not informed with a moral purpose. 
Neverthele ss, "Socrates" holds, rhetoric (and hence all other 
"experiences") could be ennobling ; but 11 Socrates 11 c annot think of any 
1. Gorgias, 453a. 
2 ., :Gorgias, l~5 5a. 
3. Gorgias, 462c. 
4. Gorgias, 463a. 
. .' 
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exampCI..e; 1'1Then he considers P-:'lricCI..es and Themistocles, 11 Socrates 11 denou .. !J.ces 
th b '"1 f il d t . ., rrt . _,_ . th 't. 1 em, ecause ·u 1ey a e o ll1lp..~_a vu-cue 111 : e cJ.: 1zens, and hence 
were not true artists. 
VIII 
The Sonhist, like Book II of the Rro:,Q!:!~li£, deaCI..s vfith art as 
representation. 
Plato distinguishes between 11likenesses 11 and "semblances:r. 
The perfect example of a likeness would be in a copy conforming to the 
proportions of the original in all three dimensions and giving, moreover, 
? 
the proper color to evei"'J part • - Since, hm-iever, sculptors or painters 
produce work that is not life-size, they put in the proporlions that will 
appear beautiful. This latter kind of vmrk is called a semblance.3 
11 Ji.a.itative 11 art. is the art of maldng se.1nblances rather than the art of 
malcing replicas or reproduction,copied from. the real thing~ These 
semblat1ces as well as the likenesses.~ "have the po1-ver of affecting or 
of being affected, in hm'lTever small a degree, by the most insignificant 
5 
agent, be it only onceo" That is to say, a semblance or a likeness can, 
for example, arouse someonets emotions and lead him to do something good 
or evil; t hus, the semblance has the po"rer of affecting someone. A 
work of art may be interpreted by an actor differently t hen it is inter-
preted by a fellovr-actor: that is, a poem may be recited in the heroic 
manner or in the mock-heroic; stress or intonation may affect the audience, 
1. Gorgias, 4.62c. 
2. Sophist, 235e. 
3. SoEhist, 236a ff. 
4. Sonhist, 236a ff, 239-240. 
5. SoEhist, 247e. 
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arousing it (audience) to e:xultation or to scof'fing laughter. A dab of 
color in the wrong place may affect the work of art. This, ltfe think, is 
what is meant by Plato's cryptic remarks on the pol-ter of affecting or 
beli1g affected by someone. 
Art is product i ve or acquisitive; productive art is human or 
divine (man is a product of nature, hence an instance of divine productive 
1 
art).- Each has an original and an :image that accompanies it, like shadmvs 
" ? 
and substance.- In man's production of images there are, as noted earlier, 
likenesses and semblances; but semblances are divisible into those 
produced by means of tools, and where t he producer of the semblance takes 
himself as an instrurnent: i., e., mimicry .3 
There are mimics 1vho k.novr they are mimics; these men practice 
11rn:i.micry by acquaintance 11 ; but those i'lho have no knowledge practice 
11conceit-mimicry11 ; such are mimics who mimic virtuous men: poets and 
sophists. In fine, mimicry can be a true likeness or a false appearance 
vrhich lend s the superficial appearance of reality, but is really nothing 
more than 11 shadol-r-play11 • 
This point of viev; is closely related to the point of viev; 
expres sed in S~oosium, Prot~oras, and some other dialogues, including 
or especially the Republic.. For the mimic who knov.rs he is a mimic does 
not pr etend to possess truth or beauty or good; he does or may, hm·rever, 
strive to possess or intuitively grasp \'That forms may be grasped. He 
lmO\•rs, that is to say,_. that he E,aek2. something, but nonetheless he does 
not lack know· ledge, for he knows he is a m:imic; further, the very fact 
that he knovrs he is a mimic :implies that he has an idea or he has 11 seen11 
1. SoDhist, 265-267. 
2. Sophist, 266d/e. 
3. Sophist, 267a/b. 
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what it is he is m:imicldr.g. In short, mimicr<J is good when one :imit ates 
the Good; but m:imicr-y- is bad vrhen one has not seen the Good (or the 
Beautiful), but acts ~ _if he vmre in fact virtuous. 
The Souhist is relat.ed to the treatises on education in the 
:important sense that one of the goals of · education is to lead the student 
to know what good is and to intuit,ively grasp the Good and the Beautiful. 
If the child is not educated properly, he will be influenced unhealthily 
by the poets and sophists and all those 1vho practice conceit-mimicry, who 
mistake a dry lake for deep waters, as Plato 1-vould perhaps have said.., 
Since the material in Book JI of the Republic has been more 
adequately stat ed in Sophist, and since we have just sketc hed the thesis 
of the ~~1ist, we may apply Occam 1 s razor and omit Book II, and move to 
Book X, first, returning later to the positive aspects of Plato• s phil-
osophy of art~ 
Plato begins: there are, t hree beds: the essential bed, the 
carperrtel'-made bed, and the painter's paint-1·rork, 1-vhich is merely a 
representation of that which the carpenter has made. Hence, the art t·rork 
is at three removes from the "essential nature of the thing 11 • 1 (The sane 
considerat ions apply to the tragic poet and all other artists. 2 ) The 
painter does not try to present the reality of the bed, but only the 
product of manufacture.3 Thus, painting is only a representation of a 
1. Rep., 597c-598c, 599b. 
2. ~., 598d ff. 
3. Rep., 598b, 60lc/d. 
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semblance and not the truth.1 And so vdth (e.g.) Homer, for if Homer had 
a real tmderstanding of the actions he represents, he would have devoted 
himself, one would think, to perfo1~ them in fact. 2 But there is no 
record, Plato sets fort h as an argu1nent, of arry poet curing patients, and 
there is no record of any cotmtry which was better governed thanks to the 
eff orts of poets.3 Homer is nothing compared to Pythagoras, says Plato,'~ 
and furthermore, if Homer really had the knowledge which vrould qualify 
h:im to teach men and make them better, would he not have attracted a host 
of disciples, like Protagoras and Prodicus did.? 5 Noreover, the artist 
has neither knovrledge nor a correct belief about the soundness of his vrork, 
and so he nrust be "reproducing only what pleases the taste or 1-lins the 
approval of the ignora11t nrult.itudell. 7 
Furthen:uore, 11the element in our nature which is accessible to 
art and responds to its advances is equally far from wisdom. 118 l•Ioreover, 
the 11part of the mind (or soul) 11 that poet~J appeals to is the lowest 
part, and not. to reason. 9 11The dramatic poet sets up a vicious form of 
government in the individual soul ••• and he is an image-maker whose 
:linages are phantoms far removed from realit.y. 1110 Another bad thing about 
poets . is . 1;-hat t hey cause the spectator to sympathize vTith suffering and 
1. ReE., 599b ff. 
2. Rep., 599b ff. 
3. ~., 600 b. 
4. ~., 600c. 
5. ~., 608b. 
6. Rep., 60la/b. 
7. ~' 602b. 
8. ep., 603b. 
9. ~., 605a. 
10. Rep.' 605b. 
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grief.o Thus, when a person has troubles of his 0\11!1, he has compassion 
for himself, instead of being guided by reason, which should tell him 
that misfortw1e is best borne quietly, since it is not sure that mis-
fort.une is not indeed a great blessing, that "nothing is gained by chafing 
1 
at it; nothing human is matter for great concern".; Goodness and happi-
. 2 
ness depend upon the subjection of the passlons. The popularity of the 
poet, hm·rever, depends upon addressing himself to the "fretful type with 
its rich variety of material for representation11 • 3 
Thus, since the poet Is work is wor, measured by the s-t:.andard 
of truth and reality; and since the poet's \·rork appeals to the worst in 
man, poets are to be banished frorrr the well-ordered state; unless their 
\vork praises or celebrates the praises of gods and good men. 4 It is 1tlith 
reluctance, hm·rever, that they are to oe banished, for poet!"J has much 
chann; but the crucial question is that of becoming a good m.a.n or not. 
And this is dependent on the question -whether the poet understands the 
nature of that which he writes about. In Book II, (377, 378) Plato 
considers Homer's remarks on the gods, and judges that since Homer has 
portrayed them without a rational basis, without as sociating the gods.[ 
with goodness and honesty and so on, Plato holds, 'inferentially, that 
Homer's wisdom is not such as to qualify Homer to be considered an ex-
pert on extra-poetical matters. 
Novr the point of viev-r just discussed is wholly related to the 














Soohist, Symposium, and so on. Book X, however, is merely the negative 
side of the coin, as it were, for it implies the positive viev1 that 
aesthetic ideas are to be a pplied to education: in short,, education is 
to be aesthetic, for the sake of the Good before all. And Plato's view 
is that the continuation of imitations leads to habits and second 
1 
natures, in body, speech, and thought. "Rhythm and harmony sink deep 
into the recesses of the soul and take the strongest hold there, bringing 
that grace of mind which is only to be found in one l'lho is brought up 
in the right way. 112 The purpose of education in literature and music, 
then, is to approve all that is lovely and to condemn all that is ugly, 
and to help the student grovl into a man of noble spirit.3 It is 
interesting ancl important that Plato conceives that a \-Tell-ordered 
beautiful envirornnent for children, with beautiful buildings, garden, 
vases, and so on is important for proper growth. 
Although the laws of Beauty and the form of Beauty are of the 
utmost :importance, the most important Form is the Form of Good, which 
is the source of knovrledge and truth.1+ Yet the education of a phil-
osopher means scaling the ladder of Beauty, studying the splendor of the 
heavens but not ta.rr;yi..ng with the lovely intricate traceries, for they 
fall short of the true realities, studying harmonics but rising to the 
level of formulating problems and discovering the laws of ~Uffiber, self-
existence, self-sufficient., eternal. And all this is useful only when 
6 
"pursued as e.. means to the knovrledge of beauty and goodness". 
1. Rep., 395d. 
2. Rep., 401D. 
3. Rep., 40ld. 
4. Rep., 50ga ff. 
5. Rep., 529c ff. 
6. Rep., 530. - - --- -
- - -
- - - - -
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And so, just as in the Philebus, there must be Beauty ari.d Good-
ness, and just as in the S;ympgsium, who loves the Beautiful loves the Good, 
so in the Republic...t. Beauty is inseparable from Goodness. 1tJhen there is a 
>·mrk of art that is the essence of harmonious beauty, such as a well-
ordered state, that work of art is a copy of the pr:i.me model, and as 
such partakes not or..ly of Beaut3-• but also of Good. 
Since this is so, Plato's attack on the poets,whether or not 
justifiable, is understandable, and is not construed as an attack on 
Art, but on the use that some artists ha:ve made of form and subject-
matter. 
X 
The T:illlaeus applies the Pythagorean theory of the nature of 
nrusic of the cosmos; and hence geometrical progressions are used for non-
musical reasons, as Corr~ord points out.1 
It is interesting and perhaps significant that in the Timaeus, 
the Demiurge is conceived as an ar'cist, who uses the Forms as models, 
just as the philosopher-king in the Reoublic, or the philosopher-artist. 
The Demiurge does not make his products eternal, since sensible things 
cannot be eternal; but the products are made as nearly eternal as pos-
sible; time is conceived as a moving image of eternity. 
Concerning sense-organs, Plato's Timaeus holds that we have 
been given eyes and ears to learn and partake of the natural truth of 
reason, so that we might imitate the absolutely unerr ing courses of God 
~ regulate our ovm vagaries. 2 
1. Cornfo1u, PC., 67. 
2. Tim., 3?c-38c, 47-48; 
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Parenthetically, this is a different theme fram that of Phaedo, 
where sight is held to be an inaccurate witness and the body held to be 
a hindrance in the acquisition of knowledge. 
Husic has also been given us for the sake of harmony, and 
harmony, whose motions are akin to the revolutions in our souls, has been 
given by the Nuses to him whose connnerce tvi th them is guided by intelligence, 
not for the sake of irrational pleasure, but as an ally against the inward 
discord that has come into the revolution of the soul, to bring it in 
order and consonance with itself. Rhythm was also given us for the same 
1 
reasons. 
This :implies a benevolent designer, a reasonable 11being"; and 
so the Demiurge is Reason ordering and persuading Chance, his mater:ials 
to work upon. His task, then, is to bring order (intelligible order) 
into a disorder which he takes over. 2 And, one may suppose, the con-
templation of the ordered world, is to discover the order in it. 
This seems to :imply an intellectualist-intuitive (if one may 
use such a term) theory of art,. with the emphasis on intellectualism, 
for human reason may see the work of divine reason in the product. It 
also :implies that only when· reason is in control of "necessity" is creatim 
possible. Thus, the true artist is one who is in control of his material, 
at all times, realizing his purrx::>se only when he is in control. 
Further, the :r:urpose of art, if the writer interprets Timaeus 
corr ectly, is not only the understanding of order in the cosmos, but 
also the vision into oneself: that is, seeing that one is a potentially 
rhyt l1mic al, harmonious, integrated soul. 
1. Tim., 47d-e. 




Philebus, which shows the influence of the Pythagoreans, has 
somet'ling to say on the nature of music. 11vfuen you have learned what 
sounds are high and l'lhat lmt, and the number and nature of the intervals 
and their limit s or proportions, and the systems compounded out of them, 
which ••• are ••• under the name of harmonies; and the affections 
corresponding to them in the movements of the human body, which, when 
measured by numbers, ought to be called rhythms and measures •• • 
tha~, ••• you are perfect; • • • and he -vmo never looks for number in 
anything rTill not himself be looked for in the numbe r of famous men. nl 
Thus, it were better for musicians to have a theory of harmonics 
? 
than to rely on conjecture. - In this respect, also, incidentally, 
carpenters are rated higher than doctors,3 whose science, in Gorgias, was 
rated an art, and not an "experience": carpenters use measure or instruments 
of measure. 
Measure and symmetry are 't'That make any mixture good; and thus 
the good is a fonn of the beauti.tUl, for measure and s:ynunetry are beauty 
and virtue all the world over. 4 Thus, it seems that Beauty is known, 
not by inspiration, but by Reason, for the mind and intelligence discern 
measure and symmet~J• 
There is, in Philebus, a sound psychological analysis of 
the emotions felt at tragedies or comedies: in tragedies, for example, 
Plato holds rightly that s pectators smile through their tears. 5 This 
1. Phil., l?c-e. 
2. Phil., 56 a. 
3. Phil.., 56a-c. 
4. ~., 64d. 
5. J:!Ed., 47d-4Sa. 
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hovTever, is of no philosophical importance. 
This dialogue contains the statement by "Soxrates n that 
rhetoric is the art which is most useful to mankind, but dialectic is 
the art which has clearness and accuracy and the greatest amount of truth.1 
In brief, that art of persuasion is held here to be more useful to man-
kind than the art of dialectic. V.nat relation this dialogue has to earlier 
and later dialogues will be mentioned presently. In the meantime, it is 
necessary to record Plato•s conclusion that what makes for Good is Heasure, 
Beauty, Truth, Wisdom, and Pleasure, respectively. 
This dialogue seems, at first sight, to be totally unrelated to 
the earlier Platonic dialogues in attitude: indeed, it is almost un-
recognizable as a Platonic dialogue, for the persistent fight against 
quackery, persuasion, rhetoric, and sophistry in the earlier dialogues 
is here abandoned, and instead, one finds a 11 realistic 11 (read "cynical"·) 
approach, granting that rhetoric or persuasion is more useful and hence, 
in Plato's logic, more beautiful and better, to mankind that the Socratic 
technique: in short, the unexamined life is no longer nor worth living, 
on the contrary, it is the norm for all except the dialectician. This 
dialogue, Philebus, is akin to the cynical aspects of the Laws, or to any 
other dialogue, which holds that measure is more important than Truth. 
XII 
The Laws has something to say on the social functions of art, 
and it has a theory on the origin of song and dance. 
1. Phii., 5Sc-e. 
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Song and dance is imagined to be a resu~t of animal energy, 
impulses to muscular movement and vocalizing. Only man, however, channels 
and disciplines t his energy into the choric arts, which therefore express 
1 
joy. 
Plato, in the I.aws, says that tragedy would be admitted in the 
state, i f it were first 9.-13Proved by the proper authorities~ The same 
considerations apply to dancmg? that is, only dancing which gives one 
dignity and grace and poise will be allowed. The soldiers will be 
a~lowed to recite or enact only those v1orks which glorify brave:r:y and 
nobility.4 Dancing contests as well as gymnastic contests '!,•Till be held 
t; 
at religious festivals only, in order to keep the state just..... For 
reasons of manliness and order, music is to be not sweet, but austere. 6 
Art is to w.al{e war a serious thing, for both boys and girls are to be 
taught to dance in a.rroor. 7 More, there should be war games and military 
maneuvers once a month, and the winners are to be praised by poets, known 
8 
for valor and virtue. Art, finally, is to be used to control the impulses 
of sex:9 sublimation by art. 
The program seems to be, for the most part if not vJholly, a 
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exception the admission of tragedy, when approved. But this exception may 
be apparent only, for one assumes that if tragedy (in the Republic) vrere 
as it was desired to be, then there -wuld be no banishment of artists. 
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CHAPI'ER IV 
RELATIONSHIP, CRITICISM, Al\1]) EVALUAT IOO 
Before attemptiP..g to determine whether Plato's theory of art is 
logically related to his metaphysics and ethico-political t heories, it may be 
vTell to recall briefly some important tenets held consistently by Plato. 
Plato's ontology is dualistic: there is the one, true, changeless 
reality (the intell igible Norld ), and there is the world of flux, ever-
changing, filled vfith many differing, delusive appearances. The latter is 
the sensible >-.t>rld, fashioned (in the Timaeus) by the Demiurge, who has 
used the Forms as a model~ 
The sensible >vorld is therefore an instru1ce of divine art, 
imitative art, although one degree closer to reality than the :imitative 
art of, e. g., a painter. The Demiurge is conceived as the rational principle 
orderi ng "necessity". The Deminrge, that is, arranges preexisting materi al; 
so does the artist. The Demiurge, however, fashions everything with 
benevoleme, vTanting to fashion the world as like himself as possible. 
Although the world of nux is illusory and an approximation of the eternal 
Form, it may, ho>rever, encourage reflection and lead to a vision of the 
Real, just as human art may do. Any art-vJOrk is beautiful only insofar as 
it par t akes of the Fonn of Beauty, the Form the Demiurge and true artists 
. 1 Th t rt f V rd . .... ·t1 t 11 i d al consclous y use. us, rue a re ers, as e enlus puvs 1 , o an e 
pattern of beauty. 11 Beauty can never manifest itself directly in visual 
bodies because of the hierarchical structure of Reality ; and "correspondingly, 
1. Verdenius, M, 18. 
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the Muse r.ever completely descends to the human level, but to a certain 
1 
extent, she keeps her secret.. 11 So, true art strives to transce:nd the 
material world. Thus art, has two sides: visibly, it is inferior, a 
world of shadovTs, nevertheless, it is related indirectly to the essential 
nature of things. 2 Now· t he Form of Beauty and the Form of Good may be 
seen on earth. And the purpose of education is, ultiJ-nately, to love 
Beauty and Good, and to experience a vision of ~' which are related 
intimately, as vTe have seen in the last chapter. 
For Plato the sensible world contains things that are and are 
not, and the subject matter of this world differs from the subject-matt er 
of the intelligible world. Beliefs are blind, and can be overcome by 
persuasion, while knoi-rledge is grounded in reason, and is invariable and 
permanent. No one, then, has knovrledge of the sensible world. 
So much by way of sunnnary of the cardinal tenets needed here. 
The question novT to be a.nmvered, if possible, is: Ho"l<r is Plato• s theory 
of art related to his metaphysics? Or is it? 
The first thing to be considered is whether Plato has, indeed, 
a theOI"'J of art in the sense that Croce or Bell would have a theory of 
art. The innnediate ans\'Ier is yes and no. That is, Plato seems to hold 
t 1vo theories of art: one a theory of mimesis, the other a theory of ideal 
art. Let us confine ourselves at present to art as mimesis. 
Plato holds that music, dancing, and so on, are essentially 
mimetic, imitating persons, natural objects, movements, Forms, or human 
products (such as beds). Plato does not deny that art gives pleasure, 
1. Verdenius, M, lS. 
2. Verdenius, M, 19. 
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but pleasure is a by-product; moreover, not all art gives pleasure, so 
t hat if anyone shotud say that the essence of art is pleasure, empirical 
considerations entail reject ion of such a notion. The essence of art is 
mimesis. 
Husic and dance, for example, are held to be imitations of good 
and evil characters in men; the same is held to be true of poetry. Thus, 
although the orig:in of music is animal spirits, guided by reason, and 
although the origin of poet~J is divine inspiration, the essence of each 
form of art is mimesis, granting that the poet, when he creates, is out 
of his senses and hence knows not what he says, and hence cannot be ex-
pected to produce lmowledge or truth,_ although , when aided by the nruses, 
the poet s omet imes attains truth. (For this reason and for the reason 
t hat disputes of interpretation cannot be put to the test, Plato holds 
it better not to interpret poetry.) 
The imitative poet imitates best and most easily the life in 
i.Jhich he has been brought up,but he finds it hard to represent in language 
what is beyond his range of education. Hence, the poet cannot adequat ely 
represent, for example, the divine nature. And yet one cannot help but, 
r ecall Plato's praise of the bust of Zeus (one assumes), in the Repub\ic 
(cr. 472a.) 
But although mime:sis is inferi or, it is relat ed to Reality: it 
is beautiful insofar as it partakes of the Form of Beauty; and it leads 
to insi ght into the nature of the Real. 
Thus, i deal art would be as close an approximation, or perhaps 
one should say as great a partaking as possible, of the Form of Beauty. 
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If this is so, then mimesis may be considered as representation, but in 
a ve~J broad sense, implying , that is to say, that the imitation may be 
11conceit-mimicry11 or mimicry by acquaintance: a representation of bare 
fact or a representation of something above and beyond the brute sensible 
fact: in short, art may be a clue to what Plato would perhaps call 11ult:imate 
reality", an art that is truthful and nndest, penetrating the inner 
structure and thus going beyond the phenomenal surface. 
Bince, according to Plato, the artist of his time did not 
realize his limitations and the limitations of art, he was confused, ¥1d 
his confusion affected the spectators, who took him (the artist) as a 
source of knowledge, wisdom, truth. For Plato, a vmrk of art is never an 
end in itself, but alvrays a means, a means to reflect and to learn what 
is the inner structure of reality, 1-vhat, that is, the Form of Beauty is 
like. Plato, then, seems to hold that the interpretation of reality is 
not reality; and this is in one sense correct, but ~his writer '\-rould (and 
does) hold that there are systems of reality, and art is itself ultimately 
real, merely one system equal among others, such as the >'Torld of science, 
or the world of practical affairs, and so on. But this js an aside. 
The question now is: vfuat is the relationship of the theor~,r of 
imitation to the theory of Forms? 
It is clear that the theory of mimesis follows from the meta-
physics, since art is in some wey- related to reality, and suggests or 
evokes /reality indirectly, in that the hierarchical structure of reality 
"prevents the ideal Fo:rms from directly manifesting themselves in visual 
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bodies".1 As Verdenius puts it, 2 the intensity depends upon the degree 
to \vhich the artist 11 succeeds in illuminating the higher aspects of the 
intermediate plane, viz. of visual reality. Thus imitation, when vievred 
in the light of a hierarchical conception of reality, may constitute a 
reconciliation of realism and idealism in art. 11 
The nature of art has implied its limitations. But what of the 
functions of art? 
One function has been mentioned: namely, the encouragement to 
penetrate to the essence of reality. 
Fact ualJ.y, hmrever, Plato holds that it serves to flatter and 
gratify the audience, as >rell as confuse it in regard to reality and 
the resemblance of reality. It also serves to make people disrespect the 
gods, and to be in general bad and ignorant and womanly, weeping at deaths, 
and so on. The function art should serve is to make people imitate good 
characters, to desire to be like the characters, good, brave, intelligent:., 
well-controll ed, generous. Music, Plato says, should serve to make people 
harmonious, integrated, to realise that they do have reason and a potentially 
or fundamentally harmonious soul. Dancing should serve to produce dignity, 
grace, poise. Poetry should strive to make people virtuous, and lovers of 
virtue, as well as of Good and Beauty. Painting should serve the same 
function. Because, in Plato's view, poet~J did not fulfill its proper 
function, the poets were to be banned unless they confonned to the decree 
that they should write works to inculcate virtu e in the state, and poetry 
which was disrespectful to whatever was held to be honored, 'tTas to be dis-
carded or . expurgated. Criticism of poetry was not literary criticism, 
1. Verdenius, M, 18. 
2. Verdenius, M, 19. 
but moralistic criticism. 11 Art should serve morality" was the directive. 
As mentioned earlier, Plato offers a normative theory of art, 
where he sets up rules and standards for an artist to follmr if the artist 
is to be judged a true artist. The theory will be remembered to include 
statements such as 11The artist must be informed with a moral purpose"; 
"The artist must knovr the psychological makeup of each person to be addressed"; 
''l'he arti~ must know the nature of evei""~.;thing 11 ; and 11The vlo rk of art must 
have a beginning, middle, and end: it must be a body, as it were, with hands 
and feet". 
If the Timaeus is taken into account, then the above theory is 
grou.o.1ded metaphysically, for the Demiurge is a true artist in the Platonic 
sense of the designation rrtrue artist". 
To conclude this section, then, Plato's theory of art. is meta-
physically grounded and fo llows from his theory of Forms. The apparent 
exception cited earlier (the sculpture work), is not really an exception 
for that work is an imitation almost of the same order as the work of the 
Demiurge: it is ideally beautiful ., 
One comes nm'l to the Platonic concept of Beattty. 
One might almost say that it is self-evident that the theory of 
forms logically determi..'rlss the aesthetic al theory: without the form of 
beauty presupposed, the Platonic argument is implausible. 
Plato differs, however, with himself, in different dialogues as to 
hovT absolute Beauty is to be seen or reached. (But this is to be expected 
when one considers that the dialogues cover a span of some thirty-odd 
years.) In Philebus Bem1ty is known by reason, ru1d Beauty is defined as 
measure and symmetry. In the t r...ro Eros dialogues, Beaut;)r is indefinable 
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(or not defined), and is attained in the Symposium by an ongoing inward 
process, moving from the beauties of earth upt·rards t hrough various stages 
to the absolute, while in Phaedrus Beauty is lmown by recollection, for 
in this dialogue, the soul is :i.mmortal, and the recollection of beauty 
comes at the sight of a beautiful earth-thing. 
It is recalled that the Fonn of Beauty in the Phaedrus outshines 
the Form of the Good, while in the Symposium, the Form of Beauty is either 
co-equal, identified, or reduced to the Form of the Good, but which of 
the three is the case, is difficult to determine, for there is more than 
one possible interpretation, each of which 1rl.ll attest to a different 
point of view. This writer's predilection is for the complete identif ication 
and the possible interpretation is as follows: 
It would be mistaken to think that Plato sharply defines the 
1-;ord "good". Thus, when he used the woro 11good 11 he meant by it whatever 
is usually meant, depending on the context. That is, what is beautiful 
is not necessari ly morally good, but is identical with what is aesthetically 
good. In short, "beautiful" and "aesthetically good" are interchangeable 
salva veritate, as this writer imagines Plato to have conceived it. For 
example, Plato l'muld not hold Homer's vrork to be morally good; on the 
cont r ary; yet he would and does hold it to be 11 charmine", that is, 
beautiful, that is aesthetically good. In short, when we, in ordinar<J 
life today, say that a work of art is a good work of art, we are saying, 
this wri'i:.er believes, that the v10rk of art is aesthetically good, or in 
another way, it is beautiful. In conclusion, Plat o did not make the 
error of saying in effect that a beautiful l'lfork of art had saluta ry moral 
effect, necessarily--vritness the works of Homer--but that a v.ork, if judged 
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beautiful, is a work judged aesthetically good. 
There are, to be sur e, ot her interpretations, which \dll 
probably show that good and beauty are coequal but not identifiable; 
perhaps such inter pret ations are valid; in any case, the beautif u l is 
never reduced to the good in the sense Zeller understands the terrn 
11goodll. And the interpretation given above does not seem to violate 
common sense or Platonic philosophy. 
The only question remaining is one concerning the knowledge 
l>Then a work of art partakes of the Fonn of Beauty. M1en is it known? 
Hm.; is it known? 
In a one-sentence surr~ary of this section: Plato's philosophy 
of art and of aesthetics are metaphysically based. 
But can Plato's metaphysics bear examination? And is the 
essence of art mimesis? 
Plato's ontological dualism raises the problem of Becoming, or 
rather, raises the question whether Plato's ans'tver is adequate. It will 
be recalled that for Plato if something both is and is not, then it is a 
contradict ion and hence does not have Reality. From the (erroneous ) 
notion that something is both bad and good, Plato arrives at the notion 
of absolute goodness. The fallacy may be poi."lted up by the follmving il-
lustrat ion: 
Let it be supposed that 11fat 11 and 11thin11 , instead of 11 good 11 arrl 
nbad 11 are the ope rative words. And let it be imagined that the universe 
consists of three heavylveights, Falstaff, Gargantua, and Jupiter, weighing 
four hundr ed, five hundred, and six hundred pounds, respectively. Since 
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Falstaff weighs less than Gargantua, Plato vrould hold that Falstaff is 
thin. But s:ince Gargantua is heavier than Falstaff but lighter than 
Jupiter, Gargantua is therefore both fat. and thin, and therefore not real, 
except insofar as he partakes of absolut e fatness or absolut e thinness. 
But instead of taking fatness or thinness as an abstract universal, Plato 
1vould assign to it metaphysical reality. Indeed, he ~ assign to it 
metaphysical reality: "Is there or is there not an absolut e justice? 
And an absolute beauty and absolute good?nl 
Russell implies that all this perplexity rlOuld have been avoided 
had Plato understood relative terms. At first sight, Russell's argument 
doe s not stand up. For, Plato writes: 11Do not the same pieces of wood or stone 
appear at one time (flual, and at another time unequal?" Again, "Anything 
which becomes greater must become greater after becoming less. n2 Or, 
once more, 11You may look at a bed from any angle, straight or front, or 
slantHise. • • • Is there then any difference in the bed itself or does 
it merely look different?"3 
But Russell may be right after all, for Plato does >"~rite: 
"And when this faculty (of calculation) has done its measuring and 
announced that one thing is greater than, or equal to, another, >ve often 
find that there is an appearance which contradicts it • 114 Instead, hm·rever, 
of dealing with the word "apparentn, Plato immediately goes on to say, 
11 It is impossible for the same part of the soul to hold two contradictory 
beliefs at the same time. n5 To make this concrete, Plato would hold that 
1. Phaedo, 65c/d. 
2. Phaedo, ?la. 
3. Rep., 598b. 
4. Rep., 602a. 
5. Rep., 602a. 
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someone could not s.ay that opera is both enjoyable and unenjoyable. If, 
hm...-ever, one makes one's meaning precise, by saying, for exrunple, that 
the first act was enjoyable, while the second act was not, because of 
the terrible arias (or whatnot), then no contradiction arises. And from 
this, one does not move to the judgment that there are two worlds, one 
of l'lhich is Reality and the other semi or irreality. 
If this writer is correct, then, even if Plato's metaphysics 
should be true, which is extremely questionable, his arguments to 
suppose it true, are neither valid nor otherwise convincing. 
If, therefore, the theory of art as mimesis be true, it is not 
true as a consequence of a true metaphysics. The question, however, 
arises: Is Plato's theo~J of art true? Or rather, is it adequate, such 
that it fits the facts, and not the other way round? 
The reply, unfortunately, is in the negative. 
For, whatever work of art one should select, Plato would 
very likely hold that everything is an imitat ion, directly or indirectly, 
of the eternal Forms. If so, then, the theoljr cannot be refuted, nor 
can it be held to be empirical: it is ! l?_riori, based on invalid 
assumpt ions as shmm recently. 
The theory of art as mimesis is conceived broadly, and hence 
embrace s the concept of ideal art. The concept of ideal art indicates 
that Plato intends the ~1ction of art to be a portrayal of what should 
be, rather than of what is, or what is liaagined to be by men l'dthout 
understanding. The motive force behind the norm is the desire for every 
citizen who has been educated to be dignified, posed, graceful, virtuous, 
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god-respecting, and respectful of older persons. Because poets do not 
portray heroes and gods as they should be portrayed, in the eyes of 
some, poets are to be banned unless they conform, and art-lororlcs are to 
be ex-purgated or discarded. In music, there should be no im1ovation, 
for musical innovation is claimed to be the herald of political 
revolution. 
The only argument to be offered against the above is the argument 
ad hominem that the Platonic theo!"'J, if put i."1to practice, would lead to 
aridity and to the end of freshness, individuality, and uniqueness. More-
over, the use of noble lies and the expurgation of tales and the reliance 
upon the gods for various things is no different in kind, although 
di.fferent in degree, from the milder emotional appeal of sophists and 
poets. One wonders 1•That really would be achieved in a Platonic state 
made flesh. When one considers a fairly close practical exegesis in 
modern Russia, one shudders and moves on. 
In his normative theory of art, Plato holds that the artist 
must Y.no>-r the psychological makeup of ever-<J individual, in order to 
persuade him. 
Hm·r wholly unrealistic l For, first, if a person \'rere to wait 
til l he became a superFreud before writing, there would be no Plato's 
Dialogues; indeed, there would be no lit erature. Secondly, one cannot, 
it seems, ~ the psychological makeup of another: we infer or 11 intuit 11 , 
and often incorrectly. Thirdly, the concept of persuasion as conceived 
by Plato would reduce Plato's dialogues to sham art, since his dialogues 
did not persuade (some anyho11f) of his contemporaries or acquaintances. 
Of course, Plato's purpose may not have been primarily aesthetic, but 
this premiss would lead to some curious conseE!uences; for, for Plato the 
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true philosopher is the true artist. Surely, Plato did not consider 
himself not a true philosopher. Moreover, the Dialogues are not ex-
plicable as art-works if Plato's purpose was not aesthetic (as well as 
dict~.ctic). 
Plato t s chief criterion is that the artist should be informed 
with a moral purpose. This would make art a handmaiden to morality. 
There are, hmr~ever, moralities and moralities. And it would take, 
not one individual's decision, but intersubjective agreement to decide 
what a good norm is. 
The main argument >'lith the moralistic vievi of art is that 
art as a handmaid to morality rigidifies att itudes, glorifies the status 
quo, for if an artist should express ideas or interpretations hostile 
to the contemporary regime, the guardians would either disallmv t he 
publication or performance of the art-l'rork, or take measures against 
the artist. The result would indeed be a dehumanization of art. And 
this would mean the person's loss in the context of moral, spiritual, 
and aesthetic needs. Further, the subjection of art to morality implies 
missing out on the experience of 11 seeing 11 another's vision. The result 
vrould be a "social solipsism". And this is intrinsically bad. 
Plato holds that a work should be technically complete. This, 
however , 1'iould relegate Protagoras to the realm of sham art, and elevate 
Euthydemus to the realm of true art. 
(One could adduce in refutation of the Platonic nor.m such works 
as Brothers Karama~, terrible technically, but one of the greatest 
novels ever '\rlritten. Or Shakespeare's plays with their undisciplined 
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11beauty11 .) 
The writer therefore concludes that Plato 1 s normative theory 
of art needs to be modified or else rejected as inadequate. 
So much by way of adverse criticism. The writer embarks now 
on the task of favorable cri ticism. 
Plato, as everyone knows, is a pioneer in more vrays than one. 
In logic, he tackled the problem of universals, and in aesthetics, he 
first asked the question as to what beauty is; in ethics he first asked 
the question: what is the good life, and devoted much time and energy 
in attempting to answer the question. That Plato's answer may be un-
acceptable, does not count against him. The most important thing in our 
judgment is that he raised the question. We find our mm. answers, and 
the ansvlers we give are, in my opinion, occasioned by our times and 
temperaments and/or other considerations. 
It has been held by some, Croce1 for example, that Plato has 
negated art. This however, has been seen to be a mistake. For, although 
his censorship and control vvould have the effect of not producing art and 
science in his best and second-best state, Plato would feel a tvdnge of 
regret, since he believes that poetry has "chams", and moreover, he has 
banished the poets reluctantly. His criticism was criticism from the 
standpoint of a moralist : therefore, he criticized, for example, the t~il­
lusionistic art. 11 of his time; therefore, in Gorgias and in Republic and 
lal'rs, he condemned the great art of the days from Homer to his time, 
including, in his condemnation, the works of the greatest dramatists who 
1. Croce, A, 155-165, cf especially 160. 
71 
have ever lived. But, it must be ~ted and emphasized, Plato did not 
condemn art qua art. 
Plato was aware that art gives pleasure, and did not disa. prove 
of pleasure in-itself, but was concerned with the type of pleasure art 
gives. Tha.t he desired certain art-1tforks is evident from, to take but 
one instance, "Socrates'" approval of the creator of the ideally beauti-
ful figure. 
In dancing, Plato disapproved of abandoned dancing, but he had 
the dance play a large role in education in his state, but the dance had 
to be orderly and restrained, to give dignity, poise, and grace. 
Music he considered more important than gymnastic, for music 
gave one harmony of soul, and rhythm. It is regrett able that all this 
education in music and dance was to make men skillful warriors as well 
as noble guardians. Indeed, he wanted to solemnize war by youth dancing 
in armor. The influence of Sparta on him was overwhelming. 
To his credit, also, is his desire that children should be 
brought up in beautiful homes, in the presences of beautiful things. 
The soundness of this view may be verified by checking prison records, 
or interviewing prisoners or ex-convicts from the slums. 
In conclusion, then, if one assumes that Plato 1 s end or goal 
was good, then it may be said that some of the means to arr ive at this 
end are bad, and others good; add all this, the ethico-political theol"'J, 
seems to be a logical development or perhaps a logical psychological 
result of Plato's metaphysics. 
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In sum (1) Plato's ontology is dualistic, his worlds are the 
sensible and intelligible (supersensible). (2) Only the intelligible 
world is real; the sensible is semi-real, and is both an encouragement 
to reflection and hence to contemplate the Real, as v1ell as a hindrance 
in connection with Reality, for the world is one of opinions and not of 
knmvledge, and the :tviany take opinions as knowledge, appearance as reality, 
shadows for substance. (3) The forrns are Real, but so is the Soul, and 
Life, and the Demiurge (in the Timaeus). (4) The Fonns are hierarchized 
with the Good the first principle, the principle of order, the first 
and final cause, the mental and moral forms next in the hierarchy, and 
the other forms last. (5) The goverrnnent is intuitively gra_sped. (6) 
Since Good is first and final cause, whoever knows most of the Good is 
best qualified to manage affairs of state for the good of the whole. 
(7) Since the forms are hierarchized, society is best conceived as 
hierarchized, with the philosopher-ldng analogous to the Good, the 
guardians to the ment al and moral forms, and the lower classes to the 
other forms. (S) i'Jhen each order does its own proper work, the state is 
just. (9) And >vhen reason controls the spirited element, and the appetites, 
the individual soul is just. (10) In Plato's states, the guardians 
receive education in music and gymnastic. (1) The guardians must love 
truth, but must tell lies or myths for the good of the state. (12) The 
purpose of education is to make soul and body harmonious. (13) There-
fore, art works are to be controll ed and censored. (14) Plato conceives 
art as mimesis; he holds that the true artist is one who is a true phil-
osopher, a knower of the nature of things. (15) Since most artists do 
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not know vmereof they speak, and since , as a result, people are misled, 
art is to be censored, and controlled, while the artist is to be 
banished, until he mends his way. (16) Plato does not negate art qua art, 
but his purpose is wholly moralistic; he conceives education to be 
aesthetic, and aesthetics to be educative. (17) Plato's theory of art 
therefore is a logical psychological consequence of his met aphysics, 
taken together vrith his ethico-political theories. 
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The problem of this thesis is to discover vihether a logical 
relationship obtains between Plato's theory of art and his metaphysics 
and ethi co-politica.l theories. The thesis begins liith a summary of 
Plato's metaphysics, moves on to his etbico-political theori~s, and 
then looks into his notions on art. Following this is a criticism 
and evaluation, stunmary and conclusions. 
Since Plato did not operate in a cultural vacuum, the first 
chapter begins vlith some familiar historical data, namely the times 
dating from the battle of Salamis (480 B.C.) to the rule of terror by 
the Thirty Tyrants (403 B. c.).. Included in the sketch is the mention 
of the then-current problems of philosophy, and Plato's reaction both 
to political and to philosophical issues. 
From that point on, the chapter deals with Plato's answer to 
the problem of the One and the Many, of Being and Change. 
It is found that Plato's ontology is dualistic: there is held 
to be a sensible and an intelligible ( supersensible) world. The s~nsible 
l-rorld is one of opinions and imaginings all-rays in flux; the intell i gible 
;-1orld is the world of Fonns, eternal and changeless, in contradistinct i on 
to the world of flux, where nothing is constant and everything peri shes 
and knoHledge is not to be had. 
Fonns are indefinite in m.unber, and are related to each other 
as parts of a '.vhole. The world of Forms is the "rorld to which the soul 
rust aspire; it is a vmrld which exists independently, and on which 
everything else depends. 
The structure of the world is hierarchical, with the Form 
of Good the principle o.f order, the mental and moral Forms next in the 
hierarchy, and all other Forms next. The Form of Good is first and 
fina l cause, grasped only intuitively and thus indefinctble. The Fonn 
of Good is t he one essential object of lmmdedge, without which all 
kno1rdedge is useless. To know this Fonn requires arduous training and 
dialectic; and only having had the vision of the Form will anyone be 
able to act -vdth wisdom eithe r in his own life or in matters of state. 
This takes one to the next chapter on Plato's ethico-political 
theories. Plato's conception of a best and second-best possible state 
rests on his conception of justice. Plato defines justice as every 
order doing its own proper work. 11Every order11 refers to ti'lO basic 
social classes: guardians and lo1.,er classes. The ruling class is divided 
into guardians and auxiliaries; the ruled class consists of every other 
functional class. The reason for the division is held to be that the 
ruling class is the personification of Reason and the Spiri t ed Element, 
while the lovfer class is the Appetites personified.. Just as the wisdom 
of t he individual lies in his reason, so the vnsdom of the state lies 
in its guardians. The rulers are to rule for the good of the t-Thole. 
The hierarchicaJ. structure of the individual soul and of 
t he state follmvs from that of the world of Forms. 
Plato's ideal is an educational state, with the children of 
each class receiving a different education. The children of the lower 
class, generally if not totally speaking, learn from their fat hers; 
the c;1ildl~en of the ruling class, g enerally speaking , will not lmmr 
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their parents but will consider all the class as parents, and vdll 
learn music and gymnastic. 
Since education for the guardians is to make them good men 
and good soldiers, there is to be censorship and control of cult re. 
The student must be able to distinguish "That is good from what is bad, 
>'fhat is beautiful from what is ugly. Education is to be aesthetic, 
and aesthetics is to be educational, for the good of the soul and for 
the good of the state •. 
Thus, · 11noble lies 11 are to be told lvhenever necessary. One 
such 11noble lie 11 is the myth of the metals. That lie is intended to 
prevent subversion and is intended to show that the Republic is not 
rigid in the sense that a lower class lad may rise to the ruling class 
if the lad shovTS superior mentality and morality. 
Plato's concern is to have the wisest and best rule. .4nd 
since to be one of the wisest and best means to be free from moral 
contaminat ion, the emphasis on educ ation and nurture is impor'c.ant in 
respect to the function of art. 
The third chapter concerns Plato's theory of art. 
In the 12,!!, Plato advocates the view that the poet does not. 
compose rationally but is inspired by some god. L~spiration means 
madness and enthusiasm. More, since thought and reason are absent, 
knowledge is absent. Hence, the poet is no guide to knmvledge. 
The Apolog<J expresses the same point of vie>·T as just mentioned. 
In the Phaedo, Plato implies that a true poet is one who 
transvalues values, and glorifies vlhat reason considers vmrthy of 
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glorification, such as the gods. In this dialogue, Beauty is held to 
be self-existent, and anythirlg is beautiful only insofar as it par-
takes of absolut e Beauty. 
In the SYIIl.t'JOsium, Beauty is the final cause '"'hich gives mean-
ing to all the loV<Ter things of beauty. And Beauty, like the Good, may 
be seen on earth. To see absolute Beauty one must move from the beauti-
ful things of earth through the beauty of laws. For a poet to reach 
absolut e Beauty , the poet must keep on composing, striving to bring 
his mind ' s eye to the Form. In this dialogue, Beauty is conceived to 
be higher than the Good, for what is good is beautiful, but what is 
beautiful is not dependent on good. Like Good, Beauty is indefinable. 
In the Phaedrus, Beauty is held to be co-equal v.fith Good, 
although Plato in one place says Beauty outshines all other Forms. In 
this dialogue, unlike in the 8ymposium, lmowledge is recollection, and 
the sight of a beautiful face or form transports one into sheer 
ecstasy, vTith the recollection of true beauty. 
The Phaed:rus is also concerned vtith ideal art and ideal artist.. 
Plato r s point is that the artist must follovT certain rules and standards 
of art to be considered a true artist. The artist must be i.nformed '"'ith 
a moral purpose. Art is teleological, for art leads to the love of 
beauty and of good . Art therefore, is extrinsically valuable, only. 
The Protagora~ emphasizes the bnportance of poetzwtJ and music 
in education. 
The Gorgias is concerned with the moral responsibility of 
the artist. The artist must not pamper the taste of the audience, but 
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must be informed 1vith a moral purpose, shmving that what appears to 
be good is not really good, and conversely. 
The Sophist deals with art as representation. Plato dis-
t:inguishes beti'reen 11likenesses 11 and "semblances". 11 Imitative" art 
makes semblances rather than replic as (or likenesses), a~d arouses 
emotions i'lhich can work for evil. Art is productive or acquisitive. 
The Republic is in part on the same lines as the Sophist. 
The pa:inter ' s work is at three removes from reality, for his l'TOrk 
(and that of all artists except true artists) is only a representation 
of a semblance and not the truth. Since the artist has no knowledge 
of his subject he is not qualified to be a guide to truth. On the 
contrary, the artist so•-vs evil with his false art. And since the aim 
of the state is to have a sotmd and harmonious whole, the artist must 
either conform to the laws of the state or have his >vork controlled 
and censored, and himself banished fran the city. 
In the Timaeus, Plato introduces the notion of a Demiurge, 
;-lho uses the Forms as a model for his art-work, the sensible '\-rorld. 
Ee is Reason controlling Chance, pre-existli1g matter. The Demiurge 
is a true artist, for he is in control of his material at all tlines, 
realizing his purpose only '\vhen he is in control. 
The Philebus holds that it is better to have a theory of 
harmonics than to rely on conjecture. In this dialogue, the Good is 
a form of the Beautiful, and measure and s;ymmetr.r are Bec-mty and Virtue 
the world over. 
The Lm·rs offers several interest:ing remarks on the social 
fnnct ions of art::~ and a theory of the origin of song and dance. Among 
the remarks on function are: only dancing which gives grace and poise 
is to be allmved; tragedy is to be admitted in the state after approval 
by authorities; art is to control sexual impulses (sublimation by art); 
music is to be austere and not S\"reet; vrar games are to be held once a 
month, with the winners to be praised by poets known for valor and for 
virtue; and art to make war a serious thing, for, both boys and girls 
are to be taught to dance in annor. 
The next chapter is given to show:ing the relationship bettreen 
Pl ato's theory of art and his metaphysics and ethico-politics. 
It is first held that Plato's ontologie aJ. dualism is not 
shown to be true. Indeed, it is shown, one hopes, that Plato is guilty 
either of not having a knOi'lledge of relative terms or of overlooldng 
relative terms 1men it was most urgent not to overlook them. 
Thus, even if his theory of art is sound, it is not sound by 
virtue of any soundness of his metaphysics. Plato's theory of art., 
hmvever, is shmm to be an instance of the inductive fallacy , namely 
taking what occurs in some toJOrks of art., that is, imitation, and leap-
ing to the conclusion that art is iinitat ion. Pla:to 's theory can be 
confinned in some instances, but infirmed in others, unless one says 
that 1-ihat seems to be non-:ilnitative art is an imitation of the Form of 
Beauty. This, however,. begs the question. 
Plato's ethico-politi cal theories, if put into practice, 
:I'/Ould very likely lead to a loss of individuality and to aridity and 
sterility in art . 
Plato's critique of art is moralistic, but Plato does not 
condemn art qua art. Plato's chief concern is for a harmonious, 
integrated personality and for a harmonious, morally good state. He 
therefore advocates censorship in art. Since this is so, Plato's 
notions on the fttnction of art are understandable, even if questionable. 
It is concluded that Plato's theory of art is a logical 
psychological result of his metaphysics. 
